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Dedication 
This is dedicated to all survivors who have yet to find their voice, 
and to the people in my life who have helped me to find mine. 
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Abstract 
Counselors working in a wide array of settings are likely to encounter clients who have 
significant histories of childhood trauma, including childhood sexual abuse (CSA).  The effects 
of CSA on the adult survivor are complex, and often difficult to resolve.  Many trauma theorists 
have hypothesized that these problems may be mediated by disturbances in the survivor’s 
construction of self.  This exploratory, phenomenological study examined the subjective self as it 
moved through the processes of therapy and recovery from CSA.  The data consisted of written 
material generated over several years of my own therapeutic work, including journals, letters, 
and poems. The analysis of data revealed significant shifts in elements of the self including the 
development of a truer and more coherent autobiographical narrative, a greater sense of 
connection with and ownership of the body, and a stronger sense of both autonomy and the 
ability to enter and sustain healthy relationships.  The purpose of this study was to offer a 
conceptual bridge between the subjective world of a survivor and the theoretical and clinical 
perspectives of the practicing counselor and counselor educator.  The results revealed one 
person’s strategies for creating a stronger and more integrated self as well as suggestions for 
future research. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
   Counselors working in a wide range of settings are likely to encounter clients who have 
experienced childhood or adolescent trauma, including childhood sexual abuse (CSA).  Although 
abuse may or may not be identified by the client as a presenting problem, CSA or other forms of 
childhood trauma have been found to be underlying elements of much of the distress with which 
clients present in mental health clinics, school and college counseling centers, substance abuse 
programs, eating disorders programs, and private counseling and psychotherapy practices (Gold, 
2004; Lambie, 2005).  CSA has been identified as a possible causative or contributing factor in 
several formal psychiatric diagnoses including mood disorders, anxiety disorders including 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), dissociative disorders, addictive and compulsive 
behaviors, eating disorders, and personality disorders (Banyard, Williams, & Siegel, 2001; Lang 
et al., 2008).  Adult survivors of CSA have also been shown to be at increased risk for social, 
occupational, and relationship dysfunction (Kristensen & Lau, 2007) and suicide (Abdulrehman 
& DeLuca, 2001; Segal, 2009).  Certain physical syndromes, including chronic pain disorders 
such as fibromyalgia, are strongly associated with a history of CSA (DeCivita, Bernatsky, & 
Dobkin, 2004).  Trauma-based disorders are not only pervasive and multidimensional, but tend 
to be treatment resistant (van der Kolk, Roth, Pelcovitz, Sunday, & Spinozza, 2005).  An 
understanding of the dynamics of trauma, and CSA specifically, is therefore relevant to the 
practice of counseling in virtually all settings and areas of specialization. 
Problem Statement 
  In light of the wide variety of clinical disorders associated with a history of CSA, and the 
complexity and tenacity of many of the problematic feelings and behaviors of these clients, an 
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understanding of the mechanisms by which CSA leads to mental health problems, as well as the 
mechanisms by which recovery from CSA takes place, would enhance counseling practice and 
education (Courtois, 2004).  A central theme in much of the literature regarding the effects of 
CSA is that of the self (Cahill, 2001; Ingersoll & Cook-Greuter, 2007; van der Kolk et al., 2005).  
The “self” is a conceptual entity so ubiquitous throughout psychological theories, and a notion so 
common to our everyday experience, that it may easily be taken for granted.  Therefore, the 
definition of the self, and thus the conceptualizations of the ways in which the self might be 
affected by factors such as CSA, should be approached with theoretical clarity and consistency in 
order for meaningful research to be performed.  For the purposes of this study I was particularly 
interested in exploring the nature of the self in the dimensions of autonomy vs. relationship and 
embodiment vs. transcendence as constructed and expressed in personal narratives. 
Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks 
 The theoretical frameworks guiding this study were constructivist psychology and 
feminist social theory.  Constructivist psychology maintains that the self, and individuals’ 
experiences of and meanings attached to the self, are not fixed entities independent of their 
environment, but are instead fluid, contextual constructions produced within the individual’s 
ongoing interactions with the environment (D’Andrea, 2000).  This environment consists of 
external people and events, as well as an internal environment in the form of messages and 
values that have been internalized from others (McAdams, 2006).  It is important to recognize 
that, within a constructivist paradigm, the self is not merely influenced by, or even formed by, 
interaction with these environmental phenomena; in a purely constructivist frame the self indeed 
is these interactions (Bohan, 2002).  In this sense, the self cannot exist independently of the 
environment. 
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 The socially constructed self has been explored and described in terms of personal 
narratives and internal dialogues.  The narrative self both creates, and is created by, coherent 
stories that describe and explain the self situated in time and space.  The self-narrative is an 
expression of meaning-making, and these constructed meanings can be a focus of narrative 
therapy (McAdams, 2006) as well as research (e.g., O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006; Thiele, 
Laireiter, & Baumann, 2002).  Internal dialogues, as the term implies, are ongoing conversations 
that happen within the person, again in an effort at meaning-making.  While occurring in the 
present, internal dialogues place the self in different temporal positions as the self shifts its 
perspective from subject to object, and this temporal movement may be a key mechanism by 
which traumatic material is processed and worked through (Cooper, 2003; Friedman, 2008; 
Hermans, 2003).  These notions of the self as temporally situated and dialogic were central to the 
methodology and assumptions of this study, as I will explain below. 
 This model of a self created and re-created by internal and external environments might 
seem to preclude the possibility of an autonomous self, and render the physical or embodied self 
somewhat irrelevant.  On the contrary, a socially constructed self can be thought of as deriving 
its autonomy and its experience of embodiment from the same processes by which other aspects 
of the self develop.  Rather than implying a lack of connection to others, autonomy is, in 
constructivist psychology, made possible by social arrangements that both allow and restrict any 
given individual’s exercise of separateness (Brison, 2002; Friedman, 1997). 
 Within a dialogic model of the self, autonomy and individuation, like any experience of 
self, is derived from ongoing discursive exchanges.  This model, however, assumes a speaking 
self, that is, an “I” who is permitted a place in the discourse. Absence of an “I” is indicative of 
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marginalization; the marginalized “me” is a creation of the discourse of more powerful others.  
As Harden (2000) observed, “Thus, the speaking form is privileged” (p. 507).  
 The body, while it may seem to be simply a physical entity not amenable to social 
influence, can indeed be considered a social construction.  The experience of embodiment as an 
element of the self depends upon multiple factors including socially constructed physical 
boundaries, meanings attached to physical characteristics and experiences, and notions of 
ownership of the body (Brison, 2002).  The construction of the embodied self, then, is also 
contributive to and affected by the experience of sexual violation.  As discussed in the previous 
paragraph, the ability to enter and engage in discourse regarding the body belongs to those 
privileged to do so. 
 Finally, the self exists within, and interacts with, social relationships on a wide range of 
scales.  Members of socially marginalized or disempowered social groups, including in many 
cases women and in virtually all cases children, may be rendered more vulnerable to harm in 
relationships characterized by an imbalance of power (Bohan, 2002).  Again, it is important from 
a constructivist perspective to recognize that the self in such a relationship is not simply 
influenced by, but is in a real sense consisting of, that differential of power.  
 Power within social structures, and the way that this power is used, are focal concerns of 
feminist theory.  Feminist scholars do not agree on a single, unified model of self and society, 
but agree that power and meaning are central to any person’s construction of his or her self and 
place in society (Brown, 2004). Feminist epistemologies of the self are congruent with the basic 
assumptions of constructivist theory, with an emphasis on the construction of gender roles and 
expectations, and social and political systems that serve to define the feminine self in certain 
ways (Gremillon, 2004).  Dialogic models of the self (e.g., Hermans, 2003) are also consistent 
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with feminist and constructivist paradigms.  Theorists from any of these broad perspectives of 
how reality is constructed and validated would agree with the notion that social systems that 
deny, ignore, or otherwise discredit a person’s experience, particularly one as sensitive and 
emotionally charged as CSA, serve to move that experience “outside the realm of socially 
validated reality” (Herman, 1992, p. 8).   
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study was to explore the construction of self as expressed in the 
written artifacts that I produced during several years of my own recovery from the effects of 
CSA.  The decisions to use my own experiences rather than those of another, and to use written 
artifacts rather than recollection, were made in the interest of staying true to the values and social 
priorities expressed in feminism, and to the conceptual underpinnings of constructivist 
psychology.  Specifically, feminist social theory and research consider women’s subjective 
experience as central to the development of knowledge, thus a first-person account is assumed to 
be a valid and important source of information and understanding (White, Russo, & Travis, 
2001).  The exploration of culturally constructed meanings in text, by way of content analysis, is 
also consistent with feminist research principles and practices (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2007).  It 
is within this epistemological view that I justified my decision to use my first-person voice, in 
the form of written material, as well as my third-person voice, in the role of researcher, as 
sources of information and understanding.  
 My decision to use my journals and other writings from a specific period in my life as 
raw data for this study, rather than depending on current recollections, was also based in 
postmodernist epistemology and feminist philosophy, as it allowed me to capture the experiences 
of selves that existed in a different time and context.  Constructivist psychology would consider 
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the remembered self as being qualitatively different from the self that is being remembered 
(Hermans, 2003).  Because of the many practical and ethical impediments to gathering this kind 
of information from women who are in the recovery process, including a risk of taking advantage 
of differences in social and personal power, I chose to use my own writings as artifacts of “real-
time” experience.  I think that the justification for this unconventional design will become self-
evident to the reader as the study unfolds. 
General Research Questions 
 There are three general questions that I explored in this study: 
 1. How is the self expressed in therapeutic writing, such as journals, internal dialogue 
 exercises, and poetry? 
 2. How does CSA inform the adult survivor’s sense of self? 
 3. How does the survivor’s sense of self shift or change in the process of recovery? 
Conceptual Definitions 
 The two major phenomena under study were childhood sexual abuse (CSA) and the self.  
The American Psychological Association (APA) defines CSA in terms of the power imbalance 
between the perpetrator and the victim, which is used by the perpetrator to coerce the victim into 
sexual activity for the gratification of the perpetrator.  The definition does not focus on specific 
acts or groups of acts, and can include both contact and noncontact forms of sexual activity, such 
as certain kinds of child pornography.  Although specific definitions of sexual abuse vary, most 
sources agree that sexual contact between a child and an adult, or between children at the behest 
of an adult, constitutes abuse, whether or not the child appears to be distressed at the time of the 
event (APA, n.d.).  
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 It is also important to clearly present a definition of “child.”  Victims of CSA range in 
age from infancy through adolescence, and differences in physical size and strength are less 
important than are differences in levels of emotional or social power (APA, n.d.).  Adolescents, 
who may be physically full-grown and strong, still may not have the emotional wherewithal to 
counter the advances of an authority figure (Livingston, Hequembourg, Testa, & VanZile-
Tamsen, 2007).  Therefore, I have included in my definition of CSA sexual contact between an 
adolescent and a parent or other family member, teacher or coach, clergy, counselor or therapist, 
or other person in a position of power. 
 Arriving at a definition of the self was a more daunting task, but equally important to this 
study.  In keeping with the feminist and constructivist theoretical foundations as described 
above, I have defined “self” for the purposes of this study as my experience of being, as distinct 
from that which is nonself (other), expressed in the written material that served as raw data for 
this study.  I have derived phenomenological descriptions and theoretical interpretations of self 
from the analysis of this data, and further discussed them as they compared to the professional 
literature on the subject.  
There were three distinct aspects of my self that I thought of as different “selves” for the 
purpose of this study.  First, there was my subject-self as manifested in the journal entries and 
other writings that served as my raw data; second, my researcher-self, reading and interpreting 
that data from the perspective of an “other”; and third, my remembering-self, my subjective 
experience of remembering and applying meaning to my process of healing.  While all of these 
actors were me, each was a somewhat different me, in terms of context, time, and perspective.  
This triadic conception of my self was important to the formulation of my methodology, and for 
developing mechanisms for each step of the research process.  
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Methodology 
 The notion of my self as three distinct actors in this process was important in that it 
allowed me to draw distinctions among my intended methodology and those of autobiography, 
self-study, and autoethnography.  All of these methods use the researcher’s own experience as 
the subject under study, but with different purposes, foci, and sources of information.  While   
my methods contained elements of all of these, there were significant differences.  
 Autobiography is the story of the narrator’s life as remembered and told from the present 
point of view, and is often focused more on the events of the story than on the processes 
underlying those events (Creswell, 2007).  Like autobiography, my study explored and 
communicated processes of growth and change, of crisis and adaptation, and of learning.  Unlike 
autobiography, however, was my focus on documents as artifacts, rather than simply on my own 
memories of my experiences.  
 Self-study has some similarities to my methodology as well, particularly in the use of 
existing documents or other artifacts as sources of data.  However, the examples of self-study 
that I have found in the literature have appeared to be primarily descriptive or evaluative in 
nature (e.g., McIntyre & Cole, 2001; St. Maurice, 2002), while I wished to approach my artifacts 
in more of an interpretive, phenomenological manner.  
 Ethnography, which is derived from research traditions in anthropology and sociology, is 
the description and interpretation of a cultural group for an audience of people who are outside of 
that culture.  Autoethnography is a form of ethnography that examines cultural phenomena from 
multiple perspectives, with the researcher as a member (not merely a temporary participant-
observer) of the group being studied (Duncan, 2004; Ellis, 1999).  I am asserting that, in many 
ways, survivors of CSA constitute a culture.  Consumers and providers of mental health care 
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services also represent cultures that have their own sets of roles, rules, and power structures, and 
these factors are crucial to a feminist conceptualization of the healing process.  
 The genre of portraiture was the qualitative method that resonated most for me, mainly in 
that it intentionally blurs the boundaries between art and science, and rejects the notion that 
either form of knowing is more real or more important than the other.  Portraiture concerns itself 
with an in-depth exploration of a subject, actively pursuing the particular as a portal to the 
universal (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997) and as such fits well with the aims of this 
research.  The product of portraiture is more than its constitutive elements, and this emphasis on 
the “aesthetic whole” (Hackmann, 2002, p. 51) appealed to me and was consistent with my 
holistic framework.   
 Portraiture also places a heavy emphasis on voice as a research tool; the voices of my self 
situated in specific places, times, and circumstances served as my subject, my process, and my 
product.  It was in the interaction of the three “selves” I described earlier – the subject-self, the 
researcher-self, and the remembering self – that I think the real value of this work lies.  
Therefore, I have chosen to label my methodology as self-portraiture. 
Limitations, Delimitations, and Significance 
 Any qualitative research, by its nature, is subject to inherent limitations when compared 
to more traditional empirical approaches.  Concepts such as validity and generalizability give 
way to more appropriate standards of trustworthiness and applicability.  While standards and 
processes for enhancing trustworthiness in qualitative research are evolving, it is not generally 
the intention of researchers of this sort (including myself) to adhere to the same notions of “good 
science” as might be practiced by quantitative, experimental researchers. 
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 One method of ensuring the trustworthiness of a qualitative study such as this is 
triangulation, or the analysis of data from multiple perspectives (Mathison, 1988).  Based on my 
constructivist assertion that the self is temporally as well as contextually situated, I am, for the 
purposes of this research, considering my “past self” as distinct from my remembering self and 
my researcher self.  I used content analysis to identify themes, trends, and crises related to the 
construct of self within the written data; triangulation was done by first reviewing the data and its 
meaning from the perspective of participant-researcher, second as I remember it from my current 
personal perspective, and finally by comparing my findings to the existing theoretical and 
clinical literature regarding the subject of the self and CSA.   
 The design of this study, using myself in the role of researcher as well as my past self as 
subject, presents unique challenges.  Subjectivity, which would be considered a threat to the 
validity of experimental research, is accepted as inevitable in much of qualitative inquiry, and is 
actively embraced in feminist scholarship (Worell & Etaugh, 1994).  The role of subjectivity, 
however, and attempts to make it explicit, vary depending on the study’s purpose and design.  In 
this study, subjectivity is obvious; what might not be so obvious are the shifts in subjectivity, as 
well as objectivity, among the different aspects of the design and the different layers of meaning 
embedded in the study.  I have tried to make my shifting perspectives as subject, rememberer,  
and researcher  as explicit as possible. 
 This study is, of course, delimited to a single case.  While I expected to encounter 
universal themes in the analysis of the data, my goal was depth rather than breadth.  The unique 
elements of my own experience (or that of any other person) cannot be reproduced or replicated, 
and should not be subjected to the kind of reduction that would be needed to produce a replicable 
study.  I expect that, like much of qualitative research, the knowledge gleaned from my unique 
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experiences of abuse and recovery will inform, to different degrees, the universal realm of 
human harm and healing, as well as generate questions for future research. 
  The potential usefulness of this study is supported by the hardiness and universality of the 
central concept of the self.  The self as a construct is a focus of interest in multiple areas of study 
regarding mental health.  Another value of this research is that it advances the field of wellness-
oriented, strengths-based counseling theory and practice.  By examining the internal dynamics of 
healing, rather than focusing on pathology, the insight gained from this project will, I hope, 
contribute to the theoretical basis of professional counseling and support the development of 
counseling interventions that promote wellness and personal strength; The findings of this study 
may evolve into grounded-theory studies and, eventually, to the development of trestable 
hypothessis.  
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Chapter Two  
Review of the Literature 
  It is not unusual to hear someone who has survived a traumatic event say, “I’m not the 
same person I was before this happened.”  This notion of self-loss is a consistent theme in the 
literature regarding the effects of CSA and other forms of severe trauma upon the adult survivor.   
The purpose of this exploratory study was to identify, describe, and interpret themes related to 
the self of a survivor of CSA as expressed in my own journals and other written materials 
produced during a decade of intensive therapy.  In this review I will first describe the theoretical 
and philosophical foundations upon which the practical literature is based.  Next, I will report on 
studies that address the impact of CSA on the development and experience of the self of the adult 
survivor, with an emphasis on studies that used narrative approaches.   
 Loss or disruption of the self can be conceptualized in constructivist, humanist, and   
feminist orientations, and while each may have some distinctions from the others, their 
similarities are more numerous and more central.  This review includes studies and analyses 
grounded in all of these theories.  Because the reality of CSA has been acknowledged by 
societies at some times in history, and has been either denied or minimized at other times, the 
social elements of CSA – its reality, prevalence, and significance – have played different roles in 
the validation of the experiences of survivors (Herman, 1992).  The vagaries of social and 
professional recognition and denial of CSA over time, while very relevant from the social-
historical and psychological perspectives, are beyond the scope of this paper; however, the 
importance of social convention in the definition of individual experience must be 
acknowledged.  Therefore, I must note that the scope of this review is limited to Western, 
European-American literature and social structures, as I recognize the tremendous variation in 
women’s experiences across worldwide cultures. 
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Feminism, Constructivism, and Sexual Violence 
 In various times and places throughout history, rape, specifically the rape of women by 
men, has been considered as a sexual crime, a property crime, a tactic of warfare, a tool for social  
oppression, and even a natural expression of uninhibited male sexuality (Cahill, 2001).  The 
recognition of the reality and pervasiveness of the sexual abuse of children has also been subject 
to periodic shifts in the social consciousness, as has the validation of survivors’ experiences by 
the mental health establishment (Herman, 1992).  The meanings that individuals and societies 
attach to the crime of rape, whether against adult women or children, are informed by the way 
people see and understand men, women, and children, as well as sexuality and power, within 
their cultures.  All of these topics are built on the foundation of the constructions of selves: the 
selves of the perpetrators and of the victims, and issues of value, power, and ownership of these 
selves (Cahill, 2001).  
 My theoretical perspectives in this discussion are feminist and constructivist, although I 
must first note that there is no single feminist ontology; in fact, there are widely disputed notions 
of the self among feminist scholars and activists, and differences of opinion regarding how those 
notions either advance or hinder the status of women (Bohan, 2002).  Three aspects of the 
construction of the self are of particular relevance to this study.  The question of the self as 
embodied or transcendent informs the nature of sexual violence, and whether it should be 
considered as different from other types of interpersonal violence.  The understanding of the self 
as relational or autonomous in nature, and whether this nature differs between sexes, has deep 
implications regarding the notions of ownership, control, and individual and social meanings 
attached to sexual violence (Brison, 2002).  Finally, the narrative self, that is, the self as both 
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created by, and expressed in, life stories, is the central element in the processes of finding, 
telling, and rewriting one’s story of victimization, survival and recovery (Kahn, Jackson, Kully, 
Badger, & Halvorsen, 2003; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005).  
 Embodiment and the rational self. 
 The embodied self, an individual identity that is inextricably embedded in the physical 
body, has been a somewhat contentious subject in feminist literature, and a bit of history might 
help to explain this.  For centuries, much of Western philosophy concerned itself with the 
metaphysical realm and advanced the ideal of a rational, transcendent self.  This notion of the 
rational self that transcends the physical realm generally has been associated with mainstream 
philosophy beginning with the writings of Descartes, and also has been implicitly (if not 
explicitly) male (Bohan, 2002).  Meanwhile, the female body has been the object of a conceptual 
and attitudinal schism.  It has been glorified and sanctified on the one hand for its ability to 
produce and nurture offspring as well as its aesthetic and sexual appeal to men, while it has been 
vilified for essentially the same characteristics.  From ancient times as expressed in mythology, 
to religious beliefs and practices that attach shame or danger to the female body, to modern 
psychological debates regarding essentialist claims to male and female traits, the female body 
has been subject to powerful and confusing reactions and interpretations (e. g., Cahill, 2001; 
Offman & Kleinplatz, 2004).  
 The female body as an object (or even an instigator) of male lust and aggression is 
particularly important to this discussion.  The notion that the way a girl or woman dresses or 
carries herself could invite rape is still believed, if not always openly admitted (Brison, 2002).  
Even when the victim is a child, the overt or covert assertion of seduction on the part of the child 
victim, while seemingly ludicrous, can become a deeply-embedded belief in the survivor and a 
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barrier to healing (Courtois, 1996).  The experiences of shame, blame, and humiliation that may 
be suffered by a rape or CSA survivor, possibly reinforced by messages from family members, 
friends, and the criminal justice system, are considered by many to be a major reason that these 
crimes are grossly underreported (Brison, 2002; Cahill, 2001). 
 In the 1970s, liberal feminist scholars and activists openly rejected the notion of rape as a 
function of sexuality, with the intent of nullifying the victim-blaming or tacit acceptance of rape.   
Rape was framed instead as purely an act of violence, qualitatively no different from other types 
of physical assault (Cahill, 2001).  This conceptualization of rape gained a good deal of support 
and helped to dismantle many of the oppressive beliefs and practices, such as court testimony 
regarding a victim’s past sexual history, that had prevented victims from receiving justice, or, in 
many cases, from even seeking it.  The willingness of women and other activists to bring rape 
into open discourse, and the internalization of the message that rape was an act of violence rather 
than an act of sex, did much in the way of exposing, criminalizing, and punishing rape (White et 
al., 2001). 
 For some feminists, however, the dissociation of the body from the mind and sexuality 
from rape seemed to be a mistake.  They noted that the effects of rape were qualitatively 
different from the effects of other types of assault, and the basis for that difference appeared to 
be in the way rape altered the victim’s sense of herself and her relationship to the world.  Even 
women who have never been raped, it was argued, limit their freedom of movement and 
association because the possibility of rape is always there (White et al., 2001).  This omnipresent 
danger, this awareness of being “rapable,” had become a part of women’s everyday experience 
(Brison, 2002; Cahill, 2001).  These realizations led feminist thinkers to revisit the question of 
the sexual, or at least gendered, quality of rape. 
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 The idea that rape could or should be classified as no different from any other type of 
assault rested on two distinct but interrelated assumptions.  The first is the classical Western 
philosophy of Cartesian dualism, the notion that the mind, as the true essence of the self, is 
separate from the body.  If we accept this dualistic assumption, it would seem that recovering 
from rape should be like recovering from any other assault.  This kind of reasoning can lead to 
the presumption that, once the flesh has healed, the problem is over because the transcendent self 
has been untouched.  Even the presence of typical post-traumatic stress could be explained in 
such a framework, as anyone who has been victimized is susceptible to the development of such 
responses.  It would follow, then, that the transcendent self should be quite able to recover from 
rape just as it would any physical assault (Cahill, 2001).  The second assumption is that equality 
means sameness.  In this line of thinking, if women claimed equality, they would have to accept 
the notion of sameness, a notion that precludes a gendered interpretation of any event, including 
the experience of rape.  
 Like many either/or proclamations, this notion of rape as an act of violence, not sex, 
opened the door to a host of unforeseen consequences.  If rape was simply another form of 
physical assault, why should rape victims be treated any differently from other crime victims?  
Why should their names and pictures be kept private?  Why should the range of questions asked 
in court proceedings be limited?  Why couldn’t women just get over it? 
 Finding the answers to these questions required a re-evaluation of the feminine self.  
Feminist inquiry is rooted in respect for the voice of the woman as one of authority (Brabeck, 
2000; Brown, 2004), and the experiences of women who had been raped belied the idea that the 
phenomenon of rape was no different from that of being physically assaulted.  The notion of the  
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self as embodied had to be brought into open discourse again, but without the kind of biological 
determinism that would bring us back to accepting the female body as inherently, and thus 
inevitably, rapable (Cahill, 2001).  
 Postmodernism offers an alternative to the dichotomous thinking that constrains other 
epistemologies.  Rather than considering body and mind, or intellect and emotion, as dualities, 
they can be thought of as complimentary aspects of a complex and multidimensional self, what 
Battersby (1998) colorfully termed “fleshy metaphysics.”  Likewise, a postmodernist acceptance 
of reality as fluid and dynamic allows a model of embodiment as being experienced in different 
ways by different individuals and in different contexts (Bohan, 2002).  This critical paradigm 
shift, away from the constriction of seeking some single universal truth with regards to the 
phenomenon of rape, allowed a return to the proper and appropriate locus of inquiry: the 
subjective experience of the individual woman (Brabeck, 2000). 
 Autonomy and the relational self. 
 The question of the self, particularly the feminine self, as autonomous or relational can 
get stuck in the same kind of quagmire when dualistic, modernistic, thinking is employed.  The 
question of the nature of autonomy and relationship in the construction of women’s selves has 
been a significant source of debate throughout the 20
th
 century (Friedman, 1997) and continues 
into the current one.  A central aspect of the idealized rational (and again, implicitly male) self is 
its potential to achieve autonomy.  This autonomous self is the agent of its own actions, the 
creator of its own worldview, and the referent for its experiences.  The body is the vehicle for 
this idealized self, and as such it is under the full control of the self occupying it (Bohan, 2002).  
This experience of autonomous agency does not reflect the lived experience of most people,  
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particularly those who have been marginalized and disenfranchised in society, and it certainly 
bears no resemblance to the experiences of people who are responsible for birthing, nursing, and 
nurturing offspring.  
 Feminist scholars and theorists in the 1980s and 1990s, building upon the seminal works 
of Gilligan (1993), Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986) and others, developed and 
expanded self-in-relation models that emphasized the centrality of relationship in the 
development of women’s identities, morality, and cognitive processes.  These characterizations 
of the feminine self as relational were advanced not as a weakness or deficiency of women, but 
as an asset that was woefully underdeveloped in men.  This conceptualization of difference was 
based not in biological determinism, but in social construction of gender roles (Bohan, 2002).   
 Again, however, feminist scholars were not in agreement regarding this notion of a 
relational self, and some balked at the idea of a self that was not fully autonomous.  A woman, or 
a child, in this kind of thinking, would be unable to fully consent to any sexual act.  Wouldn’t 
such an assumption reinforce the notion that rape is, to some degree, an extension of the natural 
order of things?  Could not rape, then, be considered as simply a variant of “normal” sex (Cahill, 
2001)?  
 The answer to this question lies in the way we define the concept of autonomy.  It is 
common for people to think of autonomy as individuation and separation, even isolation.  But 
recent feminist writers (e.g. Bohan, 2002; Brison, 2002; Cahill, 2001; Hoffman, 2006) have 
instead presented a notion of relational autonomy, that is, autonomy that is rooted in, and 
contributes to, social systems.  Again, the dichotomous way of thinking had to be abandoned in 
favor of more complexity.  The self is neither fully individual, nor fully interrelated.  It is both, 
and this is true for males and females (Friedman, 1997).  The difference, again, lies not in the 
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biological sex of the person but in the social systems that construct experience.  In a strict social 
constructivist framework, it could even be argued that the self is the social discourse (Bohan, 
2002), and thus is constantly changing.  
  The narrative self in feminist and constructivist psychology. 
 A notion of the self as narrative, grounded in the stories people hear and tell about 
themselves that create, as well as communicate, who they are, is central to constructivist theory 
and to feminist values regarding the importance of voice.  One’s conceptions of one’s self, and 
others’ conceptions of them as expressed in life stories, create a coherent identity as an 
individual situated in time and space.  This self evolves as the stories accumulate, moving 
through life as a relatively unbroken autobiography unfolds.  Individual and cultural stories both 
create and communicate not only memories of what has happened in one’s life, but 
interpretations of how and why, shaping self-stories and the meanings assigned to them 
(McAdams, 2001).   
 The narrative approach to conceptualizing and communicating human experience goes 
back at least as far as William James, who in the 1890s emphasized a stream of consciousness as 
the essence of the self (Meares, 1999).  As research shifted to methodologies that were more 
similar to those used in the physical sciences, individual narratives were rejected as lacking in 
scientific rigor.  However, with the postmodernist movement in the late 20
th
 century, narrative 
research and pedagogy has gained acceptance in mainstream psychology as applied to 
individuals, couples and families, organizations, and societies (McAdams, 2001). 
 The narrative of the self, and the narrative as the self, exists on multiple planes or levels 
of experience.  At the biological level are brain and sensory structures that perceive, process, 
store and retrieve data.  These structures and processes can be profoundly affected by early 
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trauma (van der Kolk, 1996).  At the interpersonal level, dyadic self-storying occurs between, for 
example, a client and therapist, and creates the major focus of narrative therapy (McAdams, 
2001).  At the cultural level, shared linguistic structures inform meaning, and narrative is woven 
through the fabric of human consciousness (Neimeyer, Herrero, & Botella, 2006).   
 Sexual violence and the self. 
 Sexual violence can have profound effects on the ways that victims experience their 
selves, in the realms of embodiment, autonomy, and narrative.  The physical self is invaded, 
injured, and held captive in sexual assault, including CSA.  Its ability to define and defend its 
own boundaries is overwhelmed.  This aspect of the effect of rape and CSA on the physical self 
seems fairly obvious.  What is less obvious, and perhaps less understood, are the many ways by 
which the victim loses ownership of her body in the aftermath of sexual violence.  Recent 
research in the emerging field of traumatology has been focused on the enduring physiologic, 
cognitive, and emotional effects of extreme trauma including CSA.  Of particular interest is the 
way that trauma seems to imprint and influence mechanisms of memory, emotion, and 
physiologic arousal.  Flashbacks and tactile memories can appear at any time, provoked by even 
the slightest environmental trigger and often with no warning.  The body’s “fight or flight” 
mechanism may remain in emergency mode for years, accounting for the hyperarousal and 
exaggerated startle response seen in post-traumatic stress (van der Kolk, 2002).  Eating, sleeping, 
and elimination can be negatively affected.  The survivor’s ability to communicate physically, 
through both sexual and nonsexual touch, may be restricted.  Even the range of the body’s 
movement can be restricted in the aftermath, as the survivor limits her movements in response to 
ongoing fear (Brison, 2002; Cahill, 2001).  
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 The autonomous self, if considered within the relational model described above, is also 
destroyed both during and after sexual assault or CSA.  Autonomy is possible only in a world 
where individuals act according to social norms, creating a reasonably predictable world.  The 
profound breach of trust in sexual assault can render all relationships as suspect (Linehan, 1993).  
This is especially likely to be so when the victim is a child and the perpetrator is someone upon 
whom the child’s survival depends (Courtois, 1996; Herman, 1992).  
Autonomy also involves the free exercise of one’s will. In rape or CSA, the will of the 
victim is rendered useless, even irrelevant.  The ability to function as a self-agent is gone.  The 
victim becomes instead the object of the rapist’s will.  Even after the rape, and perhaps for many 
years, the loss of will or agency persists as physical and emotional repercussions continue to 
dominate the victim’s experience, effectively re-creating the rape over and over again (Brison, 
2002; van der Kolk, 1996).  
 The narrative self is also severely altered in sexual trauma.  The unwritten rules of social 
discourse discourage open discussion about the horrors of rape, child sexual abuse, war, and 
political terrorism.  Shared traumas, such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks, may be brought 
into open discourse more readily than individual traumas such as interpersonal violence and 
CSA.  At best, these topics are likely to be discussed as abstractions or viewed as happening to 
fictional TV and movie characters.  Survivors of sexual trauma often find themselves unable to 
speak openly about their experiences (Herman, 1992).  Well-meaning friends and others will 
often discourage the victim from talking about it, encouraging her or him instead to put it behind 
her or him.  The result is a fractured narrative and, therefore, a fractured self and a profound 
feeling of alienation.  Brison (2002) wrote in her memoir of surviving rape that she sometimes 
felt “as though I had, in fact, died, and no one had bothered to come to the funeral” (p.13). 
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 Finally, the narrative self assumes the presence of a continuous memory, a life story that 
is likely to contain twists and surprises, but that remains reasonably coherent over time.  One’s 
life story moves from past, through present, and into an imagined and intended future.  Memory 
can be profoundly altered in severe trauma, to the point of full amnesia.  The past self – the pre-
trauma self – may feel to the victim as if it has died (Scheman, 1997).  Intrusive memories and 
flashbacks have the effect of keeping the traumatic experiences alive in a kind of eternal present 
that can only be described as torture.  Memories may be experienced in the emotional and 
sensory areas of the brain, but inaccessible to the parts of the brain that produce speech, making 
the act of telling one’s story physically impossible (van der Kolk, 1996). And the future, rather 
than being a refuge for the imagination or a guiding force for present action, feels at best 
unattainable and at worst, a continuation of the victim’s current agony.  The loss or absence of 
coherence, whether structural, phenomenological, or emotional, in the life narratives of CSA and 
other trauma survivors can be profound, and can be the source of much distress and 
psychopathology (DiMaggio, 2006; Neimeyer et al., 2006; O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006).  
Review of the Research Literature 
 The amount of research literature on the effects of sexual trauma, and the variety of 
approaches and theories by which this research is done, has increased dramatically in the last two 
decades.  The vast majority of studies have been focused on the relationship between specific 
aspects of the self and the prevalence and severity of clinical PTSD symptoms or other 
psychopathology.  I will present this review of the literature as it addresses the question of the 
self in three ways.  First, I will describe studies that focus on self-definition or self-concept in 
survivors, including both cognitive and emotional experiences of self, and how these experiences 
may influence the development of psychopathology.  Second, I will review studies that focus on 
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acts of violence toward the self, including self-mutilation and suicide.  Within this broad concept 
I will include a discussion of the phenomenon of the failure or inability to protect one’s self from 
repeated assault.  Finally, I will explore the literature that addresses the narrative self, and how 
this narrative may be profoundly altered in the aftermath of trauma, including CSA. 
 Self-definition and sexual trauma. 
 Trauma survivors’ views of self, in terms of the connection of personal identity to the 
trauma as well as self-judgments, have been shown to correlate with PTSD symptoms.   
Sutherland and Bryant (2005), in a study comparing trauma-exposed people with and without 
PTSD to non-exposed controls, found that those exhibiting PTSD symptoms were more likely to 
have trauma-based self-defining memories, and to identify personal goals that had to do with 
trauma, such as avoiding future victimization or recovering from the effects of the trauma.   
Those in the trauma-exposed, non-PTSD group, as well as the control group, were able to 
retrieve more varied self-defining memories.  The authors proposed that self-definition as a 
victim or survivor was related to more pervasive and severe post-traumatic psychopathology. 
 Thompson and Waltz (2008) found PTSD symptom severity to be inversely related to 
self-compassion in a community sample of trauma survivors.  A low level of self-compassion 
was particularly associated with avoidance symptoms such as numbing and dissociation, 
suggesting that an inability to extend compassion to oneself is related to an inability to confront 
trauma-based memories and feelings. 
 Self-destructive or non-protective behaviors and trauma. 
 The occurrence of various self-destructive behaviors among CSA survivors, ranging from 
sexual risk-taking to addictions, eating disorders, self-mutilation and suicide, has also been 
extensively chronicled, although not thoroughly understood.  In a study of incarcerated women, 
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Milligan and Andrews (2005) found that anger, shame, and a history of CSA were positively 
correlated with self-harming behavior; interestingly, bodily shame showed the strongest 
relationship to both CSA and self-harm, which is suggestive of the importance of the embodied 
self in the aftermath of sexual trauma.  Likewise, Murray and Waller (2002) found that shame 
played a mediating role in bulimic behavior in a nonclinical sample of college women with a 
reported history of CSA, particularly intra-familial abuse.  Weierich and Nock (2008) found that 
in a sample of CSA survivors, non-suicidal self injury was more likely to occur, especially in 
survivors with numbing/avoidance and re-experiencing as prominent PTSD symptoms.   
 Several researchers (Blaauw, Arensman, Kraaij, Winkel, & Bout, 2002; Roy & Janal, 
2005; Verona, Hicks, & Patrick, 2005) have linked CSA history to an increased incidence of 
attempted and completed suicide.  The risk of suicide has been found to extend from adolescence 
(Shaunesey, Cohen, Plummer, & Berman, 1993) through older adulthood (Draper et al., 2008).  
Using a retrospective analysis of 200 case files, Read, Agar, Barker-Collo, Davies, and 
Moskowitz (2001) concluded that abuse history should be routinely considered in assessing for 
suicide risk.  Segal (2009) investigated suicide risk from a different perspective.  In a sample of 
women students, those who had experienced sexual assault (at any age) demonstrated less 
resilience against suicide as measured by cognitive deterrents, such as self-perceived coping 
abilities and moral objections.  This may mean that the survivor might be more likely than others 
to act on suicidal impulses, although the rate of completed suicides was not reported in this 
study.  
 While the mechanisms are not clear, numerous studies have linked CSA with an 
increased risk of sexual victimization and relationship violence later in life.  Kessler and 
Bieschke (1999) found a link between high degrees of shame and the risk of re-victimization in 
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adult survivors.  Testa, VanZile-Tamsen, and Livingston (2005) found a significant correlation 
between CSA and sexual risk-taking, thus an increased risk of re-victimization, in adult women.   
Feiring, Simon, and Cleland (2009) had similar findings in a sample of adolescents, using 
stigmatization rather than shame as the organizing concept.  Whatever the mechanism, repeated 
sexual victimization only adds to the disruption of self already present in the survivor. 
 The narrative self. 
 Research on the specific issues, challenges and transformation of the narrative self is 
often done in a case-study design or in the form of a structured or directed narrative, that is, 
written or oral responses to questions or prompts provided by the researcher.  It is important to 
note that, while narrative formats are very conducive to the process of holistic, constructivist 
research, not all narrative research is true to these values, principles and assumptions.  Narrative 
research can be as reductionistic as other approaches, rendering experience as a set of 
disconnected parts.  It can also be used to force narratives of human experience into narrow 
definitions of coherence, linguistic categories, or other value-driven criteria presumed to indicate 
different degrees of mental health.  Because the “self” can be defined in many ways, much of the 
research focuses on one aspect or dimension of the self, a single symptom or symptom cluster, 
and the presence and severity of psychopathology.  Sutherland and Bryant (2005) explored self-
defining autobiographical memories in a sample of trauma-exposed people with and without 
PTSD and non-exposed controls, and found that trauma-based self-defining memories predicted 
the presence of PTSD.  Similarly, Bernsten and Rubin (2007) found a high degree of 
concordance between the centrality of the traumatic event as a part of self-definition, and the 
severity of PTSD symptoms.  Neither study was limited to a particular type of trauma such as 
CSA. 
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 Daigneault, Tourigny, and Hebert (2006), in a study of sexually abused adolescent girls, 
explored the concept of self-blame as a mediating factor in post-traumatic pathology; 
specifically, they found a significant relationship between generalized self-blame and trauma-
related self-blame, and that trauma-related self-blame had a small but significant predictive 
power regarding specific post-traumatic symptoms.  
 Other researchers have focused on the disruption of autobiographical memory, or 
“broken” self-narratives, as a locus of distress among survivors (Sewell & Williams, 2002; 
Neimeyer et al., 2006).  The effects of trauma on autobiographical memory can be profound, 
ranging from fragmentation and generalization of memories to full amnesia.  Even when the 
narrative maintains a cohesive story or plot, the disconnection of the story from the dominant 
individual, relational, and cultural constructs that form the narrator’s worldview can lead to a 
disrupted narrative of the self. In other words, the material elements of the story may not fit with 
the underlying meanings, values, and assumptions of the larger self-story, leaving the narrator 
disconnected from the narration.   
 While reductionist approaches to narrative may be too confining and contrived, I should 
note that too little consensus in our formulation, communication, and interpretation of narratives 
can leave them devoid of meaning and useless as ways of knowing (Harter, 2007).  The ideal 
narrative is open to uniqueness as well as commonality in language as a tool for generating and 
sharing knowledge.  
First-Person Narrative Research on CSA 
 The use of first-person narrative as a source of valid insight is gaining acceptance within 
constructivist and humanistic approaches to understanding human behavior, and is the keystone 
of feminist theory.  However, there is a paucity of professional literature that emphasizes the 
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voice of the victim/survivor of CSA.  I found only one article written by a professional who was 
also a survivor, and this author used a pseudonym (Hollander, 2004).  It has been my experience 
that within mainstream professional and academic circles, the direct voice of the victim of rape 
or CSA is not always welcome (Herman, 1992; Hoult, 1998).  Some of this lack of acceptance 
likely stems from the victim’s voice as a woman or a (once-wounded) child, but much of it 
probably has to do with the victim’s status as a patient or client in need of mental health care and 
the stigma attached to such a status (Johnstone, 2001; Muncey & Robinson, 2007).  Speaking 
about victims, or speaking for victims, however well-intentioned, repeats the act of silencing us.  
At the very least, it excludes us from contributing directly to the professional knowledge base 
that informs sexual violence and its aftermath.  One challenge, as well as a benefit, of writing 
this kind of study is that it is an explicit act of defiance against these tacit prohibitions.   
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Chapter Three  
Research Design and Methodology 
 This exploratory, phenomenological study was conducted using narratives, both in the 
nature of the data and in my analysis of them.  Within the broader category of narrative research, 
the differences among specific methodologies can be subtle, and different sources may not 
completely agree when defining and describing these methods (Foster, McAllister, & O’Brien, 
2006).  This is as it should be; narrative research is a fluid process in which the methods shift in 
response to the data, and should not be forced into a rigid methodological mold.  This does not 
mean that methodology is not important; on the contrary, the methods must be designed and 
adapted in such ways as to best serve the purposes of the particular research question (Creswell, 
2007).   
Description of and Rationales for the Methodology of Self-Portraiture 
 My research design incorporated elements of autobiography, ethnography, and 
portraiture, resulting in a design that I chose to call “self-portraiture.”  Autobiography is the 
narrator’s life story as remembered and told from the present point of view, and is generally 
focused more on the events of the story than on the processes underlying those events (Creswell, 
2007).  Like autobiography, my study explored and communicated events related to growth and 
change, crisis and adaptation, and loss and learning.  Another area of similarity between my 
study and autobiography was that I had to provide some amount of autobiographical narrative in 
order to supply the relevant contextual events that shaped the meaning of the data.  Unlike 
autobiography, however, has been my focus on documents as artifacts rather than simply on my 
own memories of my experiences.  This was, of course, intentional, in that I hoped to capture the 
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phenomena as I experienced them at the time they were occurring, rather than as I perceived 
them at the time of data analysis and reporting.   
Ethnography, which is derived from research traditions in anthropology and sociology, is 
the description and interpretation of a cultural group for the benefit of those who are outside of 
that culture (Creswell, 2007; Quimby, 2006).  Autoethnography examines cultural phenomena 
from multiple perspectives, with the researcher as a member (not merely a temporary participant-
observer) of the group being studied (Duncan, 2004; Ellis, 1999).  At first glance, I might have 
rejected the idea that people recovering from childhood sexual abuse constitute a culture, but 
when I really examined that question, I had to reconsider.  Clearly, the broader culture to which 
we all belong assigns meaning and value to the experiences of sexual abuse and recovery 
(Meares, 1999).  As a feminist researcher, I recognized that the culture-bound meanings and 
implications of my journey were of central importance, as they shaped the intrapersonal and 
interpersonal processes of meaning-making.   
The cultures of the mental health care system, both its providers and its consumers, also 
present sets of roles, rules, and power structures that I thought were crucial to a feminist 
conceptualization of the healing process and the experience of being a consumer of mental health 
care (Foster, McAllister, & O’Brien, 2006).  One of the driving forces for me in doing this work 
was the hope that it might offer the audience of my research – counselors and counselor 
educators – a glimpse into a world that is, in many ways, different from the one they normally 
occupy.  The experience of enduring a course of serious emotional dysfunction and its treatment 
can profoundly alter one’s worldview (Barowski, 2007), something that I hope this work 
partially elucidates.  The view from “the other side of the couch” is crucial to the production of 
an accurate and useful phenomenology of healing from trauma, because so much of that healing 
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takes place within a system that has its own language, rules, and roles that can be confusing and 
intimidating (Burnard, 2007).  Having the perspective of both client and counselor, and having 
navigated a path between those two worlds, was central to my overall purpose, and consistent 
with the values and assumptions of autoethnography (Duncan, 2004; Muncey, 2005; Muncey & 
Robinson, 2007).  
 The genre of portraiture was the qualitative approach that resonated most for me, mainly 
in that it intentionally blurs the boundaries between art and science, and rejects the notion that 
either form of knowing is more real or more important than the other.  Portraiture concerns itself 
with an in-depth exploration of a subject, actively pursuing the particular as a portal to the 
universal (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997).  Another aspect of portraiture that appealed to 
me was its emphasis on positive phenomena, not just problems or pathology.  This was very 
important to me, because it was not my intention to simply produce a recitation of things that 
have happened to me, but a meaningful exploration of one example of the real harm done by 
sexual abuse, and the complex mechanisms of healing.  The product of portraiture, like all art, is 
more than its constitutive elements, just as a painting is more than its brush strokes and a song 
more than its notes.  This emphasis on the “aesthetic whole” (Hackmann, 2002, p. 51) appealed 
to me and was consistent with my holistic framework.   
Portraiture also places a heavy emphasis on voice as a research tool; the voices of my self 
situated in specific places, times, and circumstances were my subject, my process, and my 
product.  It is in the interaction of the three “selves” I described earlier – the subject-self, the 
researcher-self, and the remembering self – that I think the real value of this work lies.  As a core 
value of feminism is recognition and respect for the voices of women, this self-portraiture was 
intended to capture these phenomena in a way that would be true to feminist, as well as 
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constructivist, philosophies and epistemologies.  Portraiture was also an appropriate method for 
research on the kind of data I had, in that it encouraged interaction and negotiation between and 
among researcher and participants (Hackmann, 2002).  How I intended to interact and negotiate 
with a stack of journals will be explained soon. 
Research Questions 
 I explored three general questions in this study: 
 1. How is the self expressed in therapeutic writing, such as journals, internal dialogue 
 exercises, and poetry? 
 2. How does CSA inform the adult survivor’s sense of self? 
 3. How does the survivor’s sense of self shift or change in the process of recovery? 
 Participants. 
The participants in my study were all some aspect of me.  I noted in Chapter One that my 
researcher self was joined by my remembering self in analyzing and interpreting the writings of 
my subject self.  However, even this trilogy of selves is an oversimplification; within the over 
2,500 pages of written work produced over those years of my life were embedded numerous 
selves, manifestations of me as they emerged, interacted with, and became parts of the broader 
authentic story of my life.  While I recognized that such a strict constructivist orientation carried 
with it the risk of creating practical confusion for the sake of conceptual purity (Raskin, 2008), 
failing to acknowledge this complex interplay of internal and external elements carried the more 
serious risk of failing to capture the depth and richness of experience that I hoped to convey.   
All of these exchanges among aspects of my self were performed in the service of 
examining my individual experiences in a way that would inform and provide insight to whoever 
reads my dissertation.  As they, too, will bring their own worldviews and experiences to the 
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process, they actively shape the meaning of the final product.  In this sense, I consider them to be 
participants in the process as well.  I am appealing to the shared knowledge of myself and my 
readers as a framework for understanding my particular experience (Creswell, 2007).  
 Data collection and organization. 
 The data in this study consisted of written artifacts of my own experience of recovering 
from childhood sexual abuse, which began with the sudden emergence into consciousness of 
abuse memories in 1999 and continues to the present.  The most intense period of change and 
resolution, however, came to an end in 2007; therefore I used this marker as an end point.  The 
artifacts consisted of journals, poems, and other writings such as letters that I generated 
throughout this healing process.  Some of the writings were structured as therapeutic exercises, 
while others were spontaneous.  The poems, as well, were generally spontaneous although a few 
of them were created in a poetry workshop for women survivors of sexual abuse.  The letters 
were all written as therapeutic exercises; they were not sent to the person to whom they were 
written.  
 In order to organize and manage the large volume of data, the writings were kept in 
chronological order, and each page was placed in a plastic sleeve, then into ring binders, and 
numbered sequentially.  Because my goal was to explore the process of self construction, and I 
assumed this to be a process that occurs over time, I was careful to consider chronology in the 
data analysis.  Most of the material was hand-written with the exception of several poems.  I 
used the handwritten text rather than a transcription with the expectation that this would enhance 
the development of thick description of the artifacts (such as changes in handwriting, drawings,  
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and margin notations).  Transcriptions of selected excerpts, labeled with their corresponding 
dates, are provided when appropriate for the purposes of illustrating or expanding specific 
findings. 
 Data analysis and interpretation. 
 The methods by which the data were examined, codified, analyzed, and interpreted 
incorporated elements of several qualitative research methods.  Methodology in qualitative 
research is generally not stringently defined; instead, it reflects and responds to the data and the 
findings as they emerge and evolve throughout the process.  However, this does not mean that I 
approached the data with no sense of structure or expectation.  In the review of literature, I 
identified several major concepts that contributed to the overarching construct of the self, as well 
as concepts that informed the descriptions and understanding of the effects of CSA upon the self.  
These “sensitizing concepts” (Bowen, 2006) were used as means of initially scanning and sorting 
the data, and as I expected, they were adjusted as this process continued.  Concepts that shared 
significant elements were organized into themes, and the data were re-examined for their 
adherence to these themes.  It was my expectation that these themes would be of sufficient 
substance to coalesce into a coherent description of the subject under study, that is, the 
construction of self throughout the healing process. 
 During this process of reading and classifying the data, then returning to the data with the 
classifications I had identified, and adjusting classifications in response to re-reading the data, I 
began to feel lost in the terminology. For example, at what point does a cluster of similar 
concepts become a “theme?”  Is it the number of times the concept is mentioned in the text, or is  
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it the degree of similarity of meaning among or between concepts?  How do I measure this?  
Although I expected fluidity and reflexivity in my data analysis, I did not want it to deteriorate 
into chaos.   
 I returned to Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997) for guidance, and followed their 
process of organizing my expectations and ideas, what I had been referring to as “themes,” into 
dimensions, which were the broader categories of related ideas and questions that I, as 
researcher, had brought into the process.  Themes were those sets of related concepts that 
emerged from the data, and could be sorted and included within these dimensions.   
 I anticipated that I would initially sort and encode content in three major domains.  The 
first domain consisted of sensitizing concepts derived from the literature, e.g., embodiment, 
autonomy (Diehl & Prout, 2002), control, blame, shame (Daigneault, Tourigny, & Hebert, 2006), 
and hope (Fivush & Baker-Ward, 2005).  The second domain included narrative structure, such 
as dialogue or poem, and literary devices for self-reference, or “I” statements.  These included 
direct self-reference or “I am” statements, indirect or experiential self-reference such as “I feel, I 
think, I wish,” and metaphorical self-reference such as “I am like, I feel as if.”  The third domain 
addressed contextual information, including life events, relationship events, the emergence of 
memories, and the passage of time.  
 While I found these processes of sorting, coding, identifying themes, and arranging shifts 
in those themes in subjective experience across time and events to be fairly illuminating, I also 
found them to be reductive, pulling me farther away from the aesthetic whole I had hoped to 
create. This kind of data dissection also left me feeling that my analysis had no borders, and that 
the final product could be flung far beyond the confines of my original proposed focus. There 
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were other questions that could be posed to these data and answered, but I had to be able to keep 
my focus on the questions at hand.  
 In order to return the data to a living, organic whole, I had to find a bridge that would 
bring the data back to the form of a rich narrative, one that would reach the level of portraiture. 
In order to accomplish this, I took the snippets of data and the bundles of themes back to their 
origin – back to a narrative form. This intermediary field text form, based on the practices 
recommended by Clandinin and Connelly (2000), became the nexus of the recursive interaction 
between the original data, my researcher self, and my remembering self. Once that level of 
interaction between me and the original data had been reached, I found that I could then return 
my focus to the original research questions and my thinking back to the sphere of portraiture.   
 Trustworthiness and credibility. 
 All narrative research should be produced and communicated in ways that maximize its 
veracity, meaningfulness, and transferability (Malterud, 2001), even when the study is unique 
and not at all replicable.  There were numerous methodological challenges and potential pitfalls 
in conducting this research.  First, I had to maintain an awareness of the multiple roles I played 
in this process, and how each of these informed and shaped my perceptions (Hoskins, 2000).  
Again, this multiplicity of perspectives was very intentional and, I think, at the heart of the 
potential value of this work.  At the same time, I have been vigilant in recognizing and 
communicating which voice is active at any given moment (Johnston & Strong, 2008).  I have 
tried, as I described and analyzed a concept or process, to declare or otherwise make clear the 
perspective from which I was so doing (Norum, 2000) without allowing the narrative product to 
be reduced to a script, with each “character” having its own set of “lines.”   
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 Another challenge in doing this work was to avoid, as much as possible, skewing my 
interpretation of the data to support a predetermined conclusion or agenda.  While I naturally had 
certain expectations regarding what I might find, I have consciously sought to keep the 
exploration open, and to be willing especially to include and address the unexpected or 
inconsistent elements.  This openness to the possibility of “deviant voices” (Lawrence-Lightfoot 
& Davis, 1997, p. 187) is important in that it allows for the emergence of perspectives that run 
counter to conventional wisdom, which is a stance that I vigorously embrace. I have tried to 
develop clear strategies for sorting, analyzing, and reporting information, and to make those 
processes known to my readers as well.  This kind of transparency enhances the truthfulness and 
utility of the researcher’s findings (Malterud, 2001).  My methods and tools for data analysis are 
further described in Chapter 4. 
 The recognition and acknowledgement of bias is important in any qualitative research, 
and particularly tricky in a study involving one’s own life experiences.  Postmodern researchers 
reject the notion of objectivity as irrelevant and fictitious, focusing instead on the importance of 
being open and explicit in claiming the researcher’s subjectivity (Hackmann, 2002).  This 
rejection of the quest for pure objectivity is also consistent with feminist approaches to 
epistemology, as feminist research actively seeks and embraces the subjective voice (Brown, 
2004).  
 In their description of the process of portraiture, Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997) 
emphasize the importance of actively involving the subject’s input into the narrative, as well as 
clearly defining the researcher’s own position, personal impressions, and responses.  Because my 
“subject” was not able to engage in this kind of discourse, I have had to find other ways to 
authenticate my impressions.  One was what I am calling “temporal triangulation,”  or a triadic 
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view that comes from my past self as expressed in the writings; my memory of myself during 
that time; and my current self, who was the researcher self who organized and analyzed the data.  
Another source of validation I used was the solicitation of the informal feedback of my peers and 
a practicing psychotherapist with substantial experience in working with adult survivors of CSA.  
Finally, I examined my findings against the backdrop of the existing professional literature 
describing the process of healing from CSA. 
 The trustworthiness of the data as true and accurate expressions of my experience is 
enhanced by the fact that these writings were never intended for any use other than personal 
development and healing.  I did not write them in the form of a memoir or other narrative for 
public exposure; my intended audiences were my therapists and fellow members of my therapy 
groups.  This reduced the likelihood that the writings would be censored in favor of any 
particular hypothesis or expectation. 
 Privacy and confidentiality. 
 All research should be designed in a way that the privacy of the subjects is protected.   
While I am free to choose what to disclose of my own experiences, I sought to avoid identifying 
others in any way that might cause them harm.  Foster et al. (2006) emphasize the importance of 
anticipating such potential harm and weighing it against the good that the research may 
accomplish.  This balance of harm and potential good were the guiding force in making decisions 
regarding disclosure of specific information.  Ellis (1999) suggested the use of several devices 
including compression of multiple events and changing identifying details.  I used these 
techniques to some extent as well as pseudonyms in order to protect the privacy of others without 
compromising the integrity of the data. 
38 
 
 Because of the nature of the sources of data for this study, that is, existing documents of 
my own creation, the Institutional Review Board of the University of New Orleans declined to 
review my proposal because it did not meet the criteria for human subjects research. 
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Chapter Four 
Results 
 The purpose of this study was to explore and describe the construction of self as reflected 
in the written artifacts produced during my own recovery from CSA. Specifically, I intended to 
answer three broad questions: 
 1. How is the self expressed in therapeutic writing, such as journals, internal dialogue 
 exercises, and poetry? 
 2. How does CSA inform the adult survivor’s sense of self? 
 3. How does the survivor’s sense of self shift or change in the process of recovery? 
Processes and Elements of Data Analysis 
 These questions were explored along three dimensions that I had identified as relevant 
based on my own prior knowledge and my review of literature. These dimensions included the 
narrative self, the self as autonomous or relational, and the self as embodied or 
transcendent/rational.  These dimensions merit a bit of further discussion as they pertain to the 
genre of portraiture, and my adaptation of this genre to self-portraiture.  According to Lawrence-
Lightfoot and Davis (1997), relevant dimensions are those constructs that the researcher brings 
into the study.  These dimensions arise not only from formal preparation such as the review of 
literature, but from the researcher’s own worldview and life experience.  Relevant dimensions 
create a space for the emergence and development of themes, which reside in and emerge from 
the data.  Themes can be organized within the relevant dimensions but may arise in multiple 
dimensions.  Themes that are found to resonate across multiple dimensions contribute to the 
authenticity and relevance of the portrait as a whole. 
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 The narrative self, which is central to my constructivist and feminist orientations, can be 
considered the scaffolding upon which my self-portrait is built, in that it is both the source of my 
data and the form of my analysis and reporting of results. The other dimensions, the autonomous  
vs. relational self and the embodied vs. transcendent self, not only provided focal points for the 
emergence of themes, but themselves represented “generative tensions” (Lawrence-Lightfoot & 
Davis, 1997, p. 162), or opposing polarities which, through dialectical processes, could be 
brought into the foreground and engaged.  This dialectical dynamic came to life as I moved 
deeper into the processes of reading, sorting, coding, and interpreting the data.  The theoretical 
framework of the dialogical self (Cooper, 2003; Hermans, 2003) also supported and contributed 
to this very dynamic process of constructing a meaningful self-portrait.  
 Data analysis and interpretation in narrative research is, by nature and necessity, fluid and 
self-responsive.  I began my analysis by reading all of the artifacts and highlighting those 
passages that I thought were relevant to the dimensions of the self that I had previously 
identified.  I listed thematic elements that I expected could be used for coding the journal entries 
selected for analysis and created a visual display of my conceptualizations of the relationships 
among these thematic elements (Appendix A). I then used this thematic structure to create a 
coding tool (Appendix B).  The data were sorted, coded, and analyzed in a multistep process as 
described in Chapter Three. 
From Data to Portrait 
 The visual image of a portrait, that is, a painting that captures and conveys the essence of 
a person, has certain structural requirements. It has a frame, a border or edge of some sort that 
contains it in space.  It also has a background, perhaps a setting that offers clues pertinent to the  
41 
 
identity or stature of the subject. Finally it has the subject itself, the person whose self is 
represented in the portrait.  Together, these structural elements combine to become the aesthetic 
whole – the portrait. 
 My conception of a coherent and meaningful narrative portrait had similar elements.  The 
frame defined the boundaries of the study and was important for me in that I sometimes found it 
too easy to stray from my defined research questions.  The background, from which the primary 
subject emerges, was my own story of sexual trauma and recovery.  While I considered this 
background to be integral to the meaning of this work, I did not intend to dwell on traumatic 
events to any extent beyond that which was necessary and appropriate to illuminate the processes 
of healing and self-construction. 
 The subject of this portrait was the process of self-construction, as it emerged from the 
background of sexual abuse and recovery.  The subject was derived from my analysis of journal 
entries and other writings, the identification and descriptions of themes found within those 
writings, and my interpretations of this material.  In order to create a self-portrait that accurately 
depicted and communicated the phenomenon of self-construction, I had to engage in ongoing 
dialogues among the selves of subject, rememberer, and researcher, and among the subsystems 
of selves that exist within each of them throughout the processes of scanning, extracting, sorting 
and coding, and re-narrating the journals.  I found the philosophical and theoretical models of the 
dialogical/polyphonic self (e.g., Cooper, 2003; Hermans, 2003) to be informative and affirming, 
as I proceeded to co-create this verbal self-portrait.  Approaching the data as a dynamic product 
of ongoing internal discourse allowed me to explore deeper meanings, and to accept or reject 
these in response to such dialogues.  
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 Frame: Defining the boundaries.  
 The frame within which this study is situated is the construction of self during my own 
process of recovery from the effects of CSA as expressed in written artifacts that I produced 
during that recovery.  Because the processes of therapy both prompted and were reflected in 
these writings, an overview of sexual trauma therapy might be useful to the reader.   
 The healing process for adult survivors of CSA varies according to the theoretical 
orientation of the therapist, the specific problems and needs of the client, and the severity of the 
client’s distress.  Herman (1992) and other early trauma therapists proposed a three-phase model 
that has been modified but maintains its basic structure to the present (Courtois, 2004).  The first 
phase is the establishment of physical and emotional safety, which includes ensuring that the 
client is not currently in an abusive or otherwise dangerous environment and is able to use basic 
coping skills in order to deal with crises and self-destructive urges.  Emotional safety is achieved 
primarily through the development of a trusting, empathic relationship between the client and the 
therapist, allowing the client to disclose events, thoughts, and feelings that may be experienced 
by the client as shameful or dangerous (Courtois, 2004; Herman, 1992 ).  One aspect of safety 
that is often a challenge for survivors of CSA is the ability to tolerate and modulate strong, 
sometimes destructive, emotions.  Emotional tolerance and regulation can be quite difficult to 
attain, and these skills generally need to be reinforced throughout the therapeutic process 
(Linehan, 1993).   
 The second phase involves remembering the abuse – not just the traumatic events 
themselves, but the feelings and beliefs that were incorporated into the survivor’s self-structure 
as a result of the abuse.  This trauma-informed self, built on a foundation of toxic beliefs and 
unrelenting fear, anger, and shame, must be deconstructed in order to allow the survivor to 
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construct a truer, healthier, and more balanced self – no small task indeed.  The act of telling 
one’s own story, often re-telling that story many times, is in itself therapeutic in that it allows the 
survivor to reject deeply engrained messages of silence and shame, and to claim her long-
suppressed voice.  The third phase involves the integration of the client’s trauma narrative into a 
broader self-story, one that acknowledges, but is not dominated by, the traumatic material 
(Bernsten & Rubin, 2007).   
 It is important to recognize that this is not a linear process; it is more accurately imagined 
as a spiral, as client and therapist revisit already-processed material, but with each reworking 
being approached – ideally – from a healthier and more integrated state of emotional 
development.  In this kind of an upward spiral, the client moves toward a greater ability to feel, 
tolerate, and modulate emotions, recognize and challenge trauma-based beliefs systems, and 
reconstruct a truer and healthier self-narrative over time.  Progress is likely to be interrupted by 
periods of apparent deterioration, triggered perhaps by internal events such as newly recovered 
memories, or external events such as the death of a perpetrator.  At times the survivor may step 
away from the memories and their attendant feelings, perhaps in response to feeling 
overwhelmed. As an example, I wrote in February of 2002:  
 Memories have faded, shifted to a silhouette.  I know what happened, in a general way, 
 but I can’t recall details. I can’t recall in a first-person way. [It’s] as if I’m just recounting 
 a story and not my own life. 
 These temporary episodes of what might be perceived as backsliding may, in fact, lead to 
new insights that could ultimately contribute greatly to the client’s recovery.  However, such 
periods of increased symptoms of distress (in the example above, increased dissociation) can be 
discouraging for both counselor and client. I found through my journals that every substantial 
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move forward was followed by a backlash of emotional and behavioral disintegration; it was not 
until my therapist and I very carefully found and challenged the beliefs that triggered these 
episodes that I was able to move more consistently forward. 
 Background: My story. 
 One night in March of 1999, I very suddenly and vividly remembered that the 
psychiatrist who had seen me through most of my teenage years had also had sexual intercourse 
with me weekly for at least two of those years.  I had always “known” that my behavior in 
adolescence had been severely disturbed, and this doctor, to whom I will refer as “Dr. X,” was 
revered in my family as a caring and devoted caregiver.  When I was 17 years old, this same 
psychiatrist diagnosed me with schizophrenia, undifferentiated type, and that label became the 
major constituent of my identity.  I spent most of my time over the next two years in psychiatric 
hospitals.  I received at least 30 electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) treatments and thousands of 
doses of antipsychotic drugs.  I did not, at the time, remember the sexual activity with the 
psychiatrist; in fact, I remembered very little of my own past, recent or distant.  I relied on the 
stories of others as my autobiographical narrative.  I had very little sense of a personal history of 
my own. 
 After about two years of having received (or so I was told) the best that conventional 
psychiatry had to offer, I was enrolled in an experimental protocol with a doctor at the University 
of Louisville.  I moved to Louisville, participated in the treatment program, began making 
friends and taking college courses, and my symptoms gradually disappeared.  Eventually, I 
returned to New Orleans, believing that I had been the beneficiary of a medical miracle.  I went 
about the tasks of building my life.  I still had huge gaps in my autobiographical memory, but I  
attributed these to my schizophrenia and to the ECT and drugs.  Mostly, I tried to focus on the  
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future and hoped that the past would stay just that – the past.  But I was always haunted by the 
fear that the schizophrenia was not cured, but simply in remission, and that it might at any time 
recur. 
 The sudden memory of the sexual abuse by my doctor immediately called into question 
the veracity of everything I thought I had known about my life and myself.  I knew, although I 
could not yet articulate why or how, that my “insanity” had been a response to the inappropriate 
sexual activity.  What I did not yet know was how many other lies were embedded in my life 
story.  I began to remember bits and pieces of my childhood, including multiple episodes of 
abuse at the hands of several perpetrators.  I immediately entered counseling with a female 
counselor.  I had a very strong and frightening sense that my identity was crumbling, and thus 
began the immense job of reconstructing a true and meaningful self-story. 
 I did not begin journal writing until about a month after the emergence of the memories. 
Rather than write, I walked, sometimes for hours, ruminating over what had happened, asking 
myself why he would have done such a thing and why I would have allowed it.  I felt his 
presence following me everywhere, and I became more and more distressed.  My view of the 
world shrank into a narrow beam of bright light that shone on him day and night.  I stopped 
eating entirely.  I slept very little.  I could hear, but often could not understand, what my 
husband, children, and friends were telling me.  I sank into a deep sense of hopelessness that 
eventually evolved into a suicide plan, and, for the first time in about 25 years, I re-entered a 
psychiatric hospital (something I had sworn I would never again do).  While there, I began to 
keep a journal.  Later, I transferred to hospital that had a specialized program for survivors of 
sexual trauma, and journal writing was an integral part of the treatment protocol.  The journals 
that constitute the data for this study include those written spontaneously and those written as 
46 
 
parts of therapeutic exercises.  I reviewed and analyzed a total of over 2500 pages of journal 
entries, letters, and poems for this study.  
 As my memories continued to emerge, I became aware of different personas or self-states 
that seemed to have highly specialized functions in my overall self-structure.  For example, there 
were self-states that could recall certain memories but not others.  There were some that 
contained destructive impulses, some that served protective functions, some that held memories 
unavailable to my primary consciousness, and others that kept secrets from each other.  In 
psychiatric terms, I diagnosed with dissociative identity disorder (DID), along with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. 
 As a counselor, I hesitate to focus on formal psychiatric diagnoses.  Although I do not 
dispute that mental illnesses exist, I prefer to view human experience through a different lens.  I 
believe that many emotional “disorders” are manifestations of once-adaptive responses to stress 
that have since lost their usefulness or become maladaptive.   
 As a feminist and postmodernist thinker, I also believe that many emotional, behavioral, 
and relational problems are rooted in social structures that assign value to some identities and 
statuses over others, and that constructed meaning has more to do with a person, event, or 
condition than do objective facts.  The diagnosis of DID is especially sensitive, in that it seems to 
have enjoyed a wave of popularity on the one hand, along with some strong professional attacks 
on its validity, or even its existence as a true entity on the other (Pica, 1999).  This sort of schism 
in the mental health arena has interesting social and political underpinnings that are beyond the 
scope of this study, and it is not my intention to delve into the subject any more than is necessary 
for the purposes of this study.  However, my experience of fragmentation was severe enough that 
it became a major focus of my healing work, and to ignore it would be to deny my readers the 
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very perspective that is the heart of this work: the construction (in my case, preceded by a 
deconstruction) of selves in the process of healing from CSA.   
 I see the arrangement of my self-structure as a creative and powerful way of surviving 
experiences that would otherwise have killed me, and for sequestering memories, feelings, and 
impulses that I was not yet ready to bring into full consciousness.  In the dialogical theory of the 
self, a type of narrative theory, it is maintained that all individuals contain multiple selves, often 
in conflict with each other and containing their own memories, emotions, and psychological 
functions (Cooper, 2003; Friedman, 2008; Hermans, 1996).  In most cases, these self-states 
operate outside of everyday consciousness but can be called into the forefront for self-reflective 
or therapeutic purposes.  Clinically significant sequestering of these selves, to the point that the 
person meets diagnostic criteria for DID (APA, 2000), has been approached in different ways by 
various authors (e.g., Herman, 1992; Pica, 1999; Straker, Watson, & Robinson, 2002; van der 
Hart, Nijenhuis, Steele, & Brown, 2004).  Within narrative/constructivist paradigms, DID can be 
seen as representing a more extreme version of this experience of multiple internal selves.  
Interestingly, Hermans (1996) conceptualized DID not as a dialogical structure or process, but as 
a series of disconnected monologues, or self-states that have lost (or perhaps never had) the 
ability to communicate with each other.  Because narrative and dialogical models are central to 
my constructivist view of the self, this notion of sequestered self-states as monologues rather 
than dialogues appeals to me. However, I do not intend to speculate on the mechanisms by which 
DID develops; I have chosen to disclose the existence and degree of my dissociative experiences 
because they are integral to my story of healing.  In order to avoid, as much as possible, a focus 
on the phenomenon of dissociation as pathology, I will refer to my distinct experiences of self as 
self-states rather than parts or alters. 
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 Subject: The construction of the self as expressed in written artifacts.  
 I agree with Brison (2002) that rape creates a kind of death; I would add that 
remembering long-forgotten rapes has a similar effect. The self who had existed before the 
abuse, and the self that I had constructed before the recovery of the memories, no longer existed, 
and yet their passing went unnoticed by most people in my life.  No funeral, no flowers, no 
remembrances – there was no real acknowledgement of the loss.  
  Furthermore, the person who had existed prior to the abuse was, in my case, itself very 
incomplete and fragmented. I spent much of my time in therapy searching for a “before” – that 
is, searching for the self who had been present before the abuse began.  I believed that, if I could 
find her, I could connect with my true, untainted, uncontaminated self. But I have never been 
able to find her.  And the person who remained, the raped one, the person whose deepest and 
ugliest wounds were invisible, was encouraged to just move on, just get over it, get back to my 
“old self.”  But the old self was dead, and before I could bury her I had to know what happened.  
In that sense, trauma therapy is like a necropsy, and healing is as much a process of grieving the 
lost self as it is one of creating and strengthening the new self.  In this study, I am attempting to 
describe in a meaningful and clinically useful way the processes involved in my own 
deconstruction and reconstruction, a process which, I must admit, continues, and which I expect 
to continue for some time to come. 
Overall Structure of the Data: Journal Entries and Other Writings 
 My journal entries can be grouped into three major categories.  First, there are pure 
narratives, that is, stories of what happened, what effect these events had on me, and my feelings 
and beliefs about these events and their effects.  These narratives were written repeatedly over 
time, usually for the purpose of sharing in a therapy group.  Over time, the narratives 
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demonstrated not only a deepening of insight but a filling in of gaps in my autobiography, thus 
gradually evolving into a more coherent self-story. 
 The second category of entries consisted of internal dialogues between and among my 
internal self-states.  These were often contentious and painful, in that self-states that had been 
created for opposing purposes had to be convinced to communicate and share information and 
feelings – something antithetical to their very reason for existing.  Although these dialogues were 
among the most difficult of my healing work, I believe they contained the core of my 
transformation and integration. 
 The third type of journal entries was written for the purpose of emotional expression. One 
of the legacies of my early life experiences, as is common among survivors of CSA, is that 
intense, almost unbearable emotions rise up from some deep, primal source and demand 
expression.  They insist that we, who had learned so well and so early to be numb, feel agonizing 
pain, anger, fear, and grief.  They command that we, for whom silence had always been a matter 
of survival, express these emotions.  If we attempt to ignore or deny the demands of these 
emotions, they find other ways to make their presence known, often through dangerous 
psychopathologies that only serve to temporarily satisfy the insistence of emotional expression, 
but soon contribute to the cumulative misery and shame.  Recognizing and expressing positive 
emotions, such as love and joy can, paradoxically, be as difficult and frightening as the darker 
emotions (Courtois, 2004; Herman, 1992; Williams, 2006).  Healthy emotional expression, as 
impossible as it may seem to the trauma survivor, is essential to healing.  In my experience, 
expressive therapies using a wide range of verbal and nonverbal modalities were key 
components of trauma recovery work. 
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 My expressive work consisted of writing, both in narrative and poetic forms, visual arts, 
physical expressions such as dance and kickboxing, and verbalization of feelings.  I often found 
that listening to music could serve as a catalyst for emotional expression, and I used it for that 
purpose.  Because of the boundaries of this study, however, I will limit my analysis and 
discussion to written expressions of emotion, specifically those writings that informed my sense 
of self.  These entries allowed me to purge myself of intense emotion, at least to some extent.  
They also allowed me to communicate experiences that had been entombed in silence for 
decades.      
 I must mention that there were some pages missing from the notebooks I had used for 
journals; the reasons for these gaps were sometimes apparent but not always.  I made every effort 
to collect and organize every page I could find; however, I maintained my own boundaries and 
the privacy of others by excluding elements of the narrative that I prefer not to disclose, as well 
as those that were not germane to the topic of this study.  I did not edit or remove any process 
elements, as these are the central focus of this study.  
Identification of Themes 
 After several rounds of data analysis, I was able to identify nine major themes related to 
the construction of the self, each of which could be connected to the original relevant dimensions 
of the self as a narrative construction, the self as embodied vs. transcendent, and the self as 
autonomous vs. relational. I found that there was a good deal of overlap among these 
dimensions, which did not surprise me. However, even with that overlap, I did find the relevant 
dimensions and their constitutive themes to be distinct enough that each could be explored and 
analyzed.  Within the dimension of the narrative self, I will discuss my findings related to 
narrative coherence and re-storying. With regards to the embodied self, I will discuss the themes 
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of body-blame and body ownership and control. In the dimension of the autonomous self, I will 
describe the themes of power, diagnosis as identity, and redefining relationships and roles. 
 Themes related to the narrative self. 
 Narrative coherence. 
 Narratives – that is, stories – require certain elements in order to be considered whole and 
coherent (McAdams, 2006).  They must have some sort of a plot line, and the sequence of events 
must occur in such a way as to make sense to the listener.  The story has a beginning, middle, 
and end; it has some sort of crisis, obstacle, challenge, or other event of interest to the 
protagonist.  The characters in the story, including the narrator, must be considered credible, 
even if only in the form of a fantasy.  The human tendency to impose order and narrative “rules” 
onto an incoherent or incomplete story is strong.  Gaps in the construction of the story must be 
filled in, and this might be accomplished by relying on information provided by others.  This was 
true in my case; most of my self-story until 1999 consisted of people, events, causalities and 
effects told to me by others.  It was, to say the least, an unusual story, but it the met the criteria 
listed above.  When that story crumbled, my need for narrative coherence compelled me to find 
and understand my true self-story. 
 Furthermore, stories exist to be told (McAdams, 2006).  The telling of my mythological 
story had never been something that came easily to me, so I went through my adulthood unheard 
and, it seemed to me, unseen.  The self that I had presented to the world, the one that others 
defined me by, had always felt to me like a lie, and I had never understood why. When my true 
story began to emerge, it was met by many of the people in my life with strong resistance; I was 
given implicit as well as explicit messages that I should keep this story, the ugly, true story, to 
myself.  These messages, along with the secret-keeping that I had learned since childhood, 
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converged into a powerful force that pushed against not only the telling of my story to others, but 
even the knowing and remembering of my story within myself. 
 In order to create a portrait based on narratives over time, I chose to focus on a series of 
narratives of my experiences with the psychiatrist written over a period of several years.  This 
process of repeated telling of the same story is a key element of narrative therapy, in that it 
eventually allows for new meanings to emerge (Straker et al., 2002). I chose to use repeated 
narratives of the same story, rather than those of different events in my life, with the expectation 
that changes in self-representation would be easier to follow when the overall topic of each 
narrative is the same. However, certain other narratives that held important information related to 
the abuse by the psychiatrist were included as well, as they served to better illuminate the story.  
For example, my memories of being confined to mental hospitals as a teenager, and my return to 
that status as an adult, contributed greatly to my story in that they, usually out of necessity but 
often out of ignorance, re-created the same subjective experiences I was trying to overcome. This 
will be explored in more detail later. 
 As mentioned earlier, my first memory of abuse came to me suddenly and with piercing 
clarity: Dr. X had been having sex with me for two years or so before diagnosing me with 
schizophrenia and discarding me to the trash-heap of the hopelessly insane.  I remembered not 
only that it had happened, but I knew immediately that it meant I had never been schizophrenic.  
The impact of that realization, that the thing that had been my identity, my greatest obstacle, and 
eventually my triumph, was a lie, was overwhelming to me.  I quickly realized that I had, at the 
time of my diagnosis, only two choices: Either I could continue to be a full-time rape victim, or I 
could be crazy.  Of the two, being crazy was the more attractive option. 
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 Of course, the dynamics of the abuse and its effects on me were far more complex and 
less conscious than a simple decision to be crazy; but in its simplest terms, that’s what had 
happened.  Being crazy had been my means of escaping being raped.  At that time, and in those 
circumstances, the idea of other options – such as refusing his advances, or telling someone what 
he was doing, or simply refusing to see him anymore – did not seem possible to me.  
 The implications of this simple yet crushing realization were staggering.  What might my 
life had been like if he had not done this to me?  What other choices might I have had?  Would I 
still have lived my life with the nagging fear that something was out there, waiting to spring out 
on me and take away everything I had worked so hard to build?  And underneath all of these 
questions was the biggest question of all: Why?  Why had he done this to me?  What had I done 
to allow it, invite it, or encourage it?  What was it about me that made him think my life was 
disposable?  What was it about me that left me with so little ability to defend myself or even to 
ask for help?  What was wrong with me?   
 These were the question that would lead me down many previously unseen paths into my 
past.  These were, on the one hand, irrelevant questions.  People don’t get raped because there is 
something wrong with them.  They get raped because they happen to encounter a rapist.  But, on 
the other hand, these were questions I felt compelled to ask and find answers to.  There must 
have been something about me that made me, if not culpable, at least vulnerable.  And I knew 
that the almost total void that was my self-story probably held a lot of the answers. 
 The first journal entry I could find was dated April 1999 and had been written on the 
computer.  One of the first statements I made in this entry was that I did not know what I hoped 
to accomplish by writing, except perhaps a sense of getting the pain and distress out of myself  
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and onto paper.  I realize upon reading it that this function – what I am referring to as a purgative 
function – is repeated, although not specifically identified as such, throughout the many pages to 
follow.  
 The first entry is also remarkable in its emotional dullness and detachment; while it tells 
the basic story of what happened and how I believed that it affected me, the intense emotions of 
anger, betrayal, and grief were glaringly absent from the written account.  It was more of an 
accounting of events than an expression of my feelings.  This is a passage from that first journal 
entry: 
 When I first started seeing him, his office was attached to his home and was a single 
 room.  A few months later, he moved to another office.  This one had two rooms. One 
 was furnished with the usual couch and chairs.  The other just had large pillows all over 
 the floor.  He said that room was for group therapy. 
  As time went on he encouraged me to sit with him on the floor of the “group 
 room” rather than on the chair. He said I could relax better that way.  I went along with 
 whatever he said.  As well as I can remember, the sex started sometime during my 
 junior year…(I go on to describe the sexual encounter in this matter-of-fact, detached 
 way). 
 This kind of dissociation of story from emotion would recur numerous times throughout 
the retelling of my accounts of the abuse.  I remember that in therapy groups, I would often read 
my trauma narratives in a detached manner, seldom shedding a tear for my own pain; when other 
group members shared their stories I could, and often did, weep for them.  
 This kind of separation of the one’s self from traumatic events or memories is called 
depersonalization; in this state the trauma victim is able to acknowledge that the event occurred 
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but experiences it as if it is, or was, happening to someone else (van der Hart, Nijenhuis, Steele, 
Brown, 2004).  Depersonalization occurs in people without, as well as with, DID; I believe that 
the depersonalization I experienced was at least partially because the self-state that had gone 
through the events of my story had not yet emerged.  In a very real sense, I was telling her story, 
not my own.    
 Early in therapy, I was given the assignment of writing a life history.  In reading it for the 
purpose of this study, I found it to be sadly comical in its emphasis on how normal and happy my 
childhood had been; clearly at that time there was only one villain in my mind – the psychiatrist.  
I still held on to the happy family myths, no matter how implausible they were becoming.  While 
this and the remaining journal pages were hand-written, this section was in a very neat, 
controlled penmanship and was free of grammatical, spelling, or punctuation errors 
(perfectionism in some areas, such as schoolwork and later in my professional life, was often a 
compensation for the utter chaos that characterized my life).  As the journal continues, the 
physical appearance of the handwriting varies from this same kind of neat, clear penmanship to 
an almost illegible scribble.  Paradoxically, in many cases, stories of my most painful and 
poignant accounts of self-loss and deterioration were written in this neat and proper penmanship, 
as if the handwriting could somehow mitigate the disorganization in my mind.  My belief in the 
myths that had been my life story, and my (always tenuous) experience of myself as a single 
intact entity was quickly diminishing.  I wrote, 
 I feel myself coming further and further away from myself. I know that doesn’t make 
 any sense, but I don’t know who I am anymore.  If I kill myself, who am I really 
 killing?  Is it me or is it her or them or does the world just end?  I just don’t know.  
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 In his description of the self as polyphonic, that is, a theater of voices or “I” positions all 
existing within a single person, all capable of independent voices, all capable of moving around 
in time and space, Hermans (1996) reflects on two “I” positions first proposed by William James 
and based on the philosophical influence of Martin Buber.  In this conceptualization, “I,” the self 
as knower, is distinguished from “me,” the self as known, based on whose construction the self 
reflects.  The “me” position can be created by outside influences, people, events, and other 
elements of the environment.  The “I” position, as the knower and narrator of the self-story, can 
construct the “me” as the protagonist of the story “because I as author can imagine the future, 
reconstruct the past, and describe [my] self as an actor” (Hermans, 1996, p. 32). It struck me that 
a person stripped of memory, despairing of the notion of a future, and having no idea how or 
why her life came to be what it is, cannot possibly occupy a viable “I” position.  This notion of 
having no sense of myself in the “I” position resonated very strongly with me when I read 
Hermans’ work.  This absence of an “I” position, I think, was the essence of my experience in 
the early days and months of my recovery work.  Having no “I” position is the equivalent of 
having no voice, and having no voice is the equivalent of having no self. In October of 1999 I 
wrote, 
 Losing my sense of self is probably the hardest to express in words or even pictures. I 
 feel like shattered fragments of a whole person and I’m desperately trying to glue them 
 back together but some of the pieces are so damaged and tiny that I don’t know if I’ll 
 ever be able to put them back. 
 As I was left with no choice but to confront and, in many cases, reject the mythology of 
my past, I became increasingly aware of the huge gaps in my autobiographical memory and I felt 
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an urgent need to fill them.  I wanted to remember everything, immediately, because I believed 
that if I could just find out the truth and deal with it, this interruption in my life could be neatly  
and quickly dispensed with, and I could return to my husband, children, and career.  I did not 
expect it to be easy or painless, but I approached it in what I thought to be an efficient, pragmatic 
manner. 
 I was wrong.  The memories did not come upon my command.  They seemed to me, at 
the time, to have a timetable of their own making; I now am convinced that the timing of 
memories was controlled by my own inner wisdom, something that I can neither manipulate nor 
take any real credit for.  It seems to me that we all possess an intuitive knowledge of when this 
kind of self-exploration must be done.  I could neither induce memory retrieval nor impede it; 
the best I could do was to be as ready for it as possible by learning coping skills and having a 
reliable support system. 
 As time went on, I became increasingly frustrated that telling my story over and over 
again was not producing the kind of results I expected.  Every retelling had that element of 
depersonalization, regardless of how hard I tried to connect emotionally with the events of the 
story.  I remember the group therapist encouraging me to speak more slowly, and to pause after 
certain statements in order to allow them to sink in.  He helped me develop the ability to call the 
sexual encounters “rape.”  But I continued to feel nothing for myself in groups, as I also 
continued to feel deeply for my peers.  The feelings that did emerge after telling my story in 
group often came up after the group in the form of a sort of backlash against myself; often I  
would cut or burn myself as a kind of punishment for the crime of revealing my secrets. 
 My stories did not become real to me until they were told by the self-states who had, 
themselves, experienced them.  In other words, the various “I” positions that held the stories of 
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my life had to be given voices of their own. This occurred, bit by bit, over many months – even 
years for some selves.  The shift from monologic narrative to dialogic discourse was by no 
means smooth or easy.  It required that secrets be revealed, that beliefs be expressed and 
contested, and that emotions be honestly felt – all of these communicative acts that had been 
forbidden in my previous self-system.  In several narratives, I shift from first-person to third-
person voice periodically, as if to step away from ownership of the story.  I think of this as the 
difference between knowing (a third-person experience) and remembering (a first-person 
experience). Remembering is infinitely more painful. The beginning of internal communication 
also revealed the profound loneliness in which these self-states had been living for so many 
years, even decades, and the sense of timelessness and non-belonging that had always been just 
under the surface of my own consciousness, even when I could not articulate it.  In April of 2002 
I wrote: 
 Pastpresentfuture – time is circular, this constant recycling of memory and experience 
 and right now I have trouble making any distinction between past and present. There is 
 even an element of prescience, in that young parts can see and feel not only what 
 happened before they were created but now know what happened after they were put 
 away into my unconsciousness.  
 It was not only the memories of traumatic events that were inaccessible to me, but many 
of the other memories that constitute the life of a teenager that were lost. In 2004, I realized that 
one of the memories that had been stashed away was a simple but important adolescent rite of 
passage: 
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 I can’t remember my prom. Tonight is [my son’s] prom and all day I’ve been trying to 
 remember mine but I can’t. I know I went to the prom as a Junior because there is a 
 picture with me and [my date]. 
  It’s not about the stupid prom. It’s about having all these holes in my life.  Lots of 
 people  forget where the prom was, or where they had dinner, or even who they went 
 with. That’s not it. The problem is that if it weren’t for the picture I would have no idea 
 whether I went or not. 
 The resistance to full expression of my inner selves came from within myself – from the 
internalized taboos and attendant shame, fear, and anger associated with revealing my stories – 
but also from others.  Not only friends and family, but in some cases therapists and psychiatrists, 
discouraged these self-states from speaking in their own voices.  I was able to trust my intuition 
and insist on being allowed to speak in all of my voices, even when that meant distancing myself 
from some friends and relatives or terminating treatment with certain professionals and finding 
others with whom I could effectively work.  I “fired” two therapists and a psychiatrist because I 
did not believe that they were hearing or respecting my insights or opinions.  I also had 
numerous confrontations with hospital staff when they treated me in ways I experienced as 
disrespectful or dismissive.  I realize now that my ability to insist on getting the kind of therapy I 
really needed was improbable to say the least, and that many CSA survivors would not be able to 
be that assertive.  
  In February 2001, I decided to terminate with a hospital-assigned therapist because I felt 
the same power dynamic that I had with Dr. X beginning to form. Although there were never any 
sexual overtones in our interactions, I felt a need to please him but never was sure what he 
wanted. I wrote, “…it means showing up for therapy every week having no idea whether what 
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I’m doing is what he wants, and sometimes leaving therapy still not knowing.” Later I wrote 
about the same therapist, “I could not allow [myself] to be put in a submissive position again.  
That’s just too triggering and dangerous for [me].”   
 While I acknowledge that there were real mismatches between myself and certain 
professionals, I don’t believe that my disputes with therapists or doctors were entirely about my 
specific disagreements with them.  I am the first to admit that I have a particular problem with 
allowing myself to trust psychiatrists and psychotherapists, particularly males. Additionally, 
however, there is a well-recognized negative attitude among many mental health professionals 
toward women survivors of CSA, particularly those whose abuse has resulted in multiple and 
persistent problems. Judith Herman, one of the pioneers of modern sexual trauma studies, wrote: 
 Survivors of childhood abuse, like other traumatized people, are frequently misdiagnosed 
 and mistreated in the mental health system.  Because of the number and complexity of 
 their symptoms, their treatment is often fragmented and incomplete.  Because of their  
 characteristic difficulties in close relationships, they are particularly vulnerable to 
 revictimization by caregivers.  They may become engaged in ongoing, destructive  
 interactions in which the medical or mental health system replicates the behavior of the 
 abusive family (Herman, 1992, p. 123). 
 In spite of these disputes, and in some cases because of them, my various self-states have 
been able to tell their stories over the course of several years, which opened lines of 
communication among my internal self-states and slowly, very slowly, shifted my experience 
from having a fractured, second-hand self-story to having one that, while it still has some holes, 
is authentic, true, and reasonably complete.  This gradual construction of a coherent self-
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narrative is, I think, at the heart of healing from CSA.  From as early as July of 2000, I was able 
to recognize that 
 [My] healing has to be self-directed, rather than other-directed, in order to really take 
 hold. I am grateful for the help I am getting… but the primary force for change has to 
 come from my center.  And in order for that to happen, I have to find my center. 
 In my present-day memory, I see those acts of rebellion against authority, even when they 
were not as gracefully articulated as the passage above, to be the force that kept me alive.  I was 
ornery, but often for a good reason.  I was argumentative, but often right.  I was angry a lot of the 
time, usually justifiably.  But every time I stood up for myself, I was able to shake off a little 
more of the debris of victimhood that still clung to me. 
 Re-storying. 
 The theme of re-storying, or creating new meanings or outcomes in one’s narrative, is 
also a major focus of narrative therapy.  I found that the process provided many of the pivotal 
events that were essential to my healing.  In my analysis of the data I became aware of two major 
types of re-storying.  The first was the ability to apply new meanings or insights to existing 
events, often resulting in a therapeutic turning point or a shift in momentum.  This was often a 
deliberate act of reframing done in the course of internal dialogue work.   
 One of the most painful aspects of coming to know and remember all of my selves was to 
acknowledge and accept self-states that held self-destructive or otherwise unpleasant beliefs, 
feelings, and behaviors. These encounters with my “shadow” selves seemed at first to be nothing 
more than rubbing salt into an already agonizing wound, until I began, under the guidance of my 
therapist, to recognize and appreciate the role these self-states played in my survival.  Slowly, 
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deliberately, and very carefully, my self-system began to bring these shadow selves into the 
light.   
 I recognized that my anger, so big that it usually terrified me, was part of the same energy 
that allowed me to survive, express my (completely appropriate and justified) outrage at what 
had been done to me and taken from me, and to challenge the authority of those professionals 
who expected me to subjugate my own reality to their authority.  I was able to reframe the sexual 
hunger I experienced in adolescence as an attempt, although misguided, at achieving genuine 
intimacy.  I learned to see my ongoing sense of guilt before God as the only thread of faith that I 
could, at the time, maintain.   
 My tendency toward self-blame, thinking that there must have been something about me 
that allowed him to rape me, had allowed me to avoid the experience of utter helplessness that 
was the truth.  Helplessness is much more terrifying than self-blame (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 
1996), and I was not able to acknowledge this helplessness until I had developed enough ego-
strength to do so.   
 Even my chronic suicidality, with which I had struggled for so long, gradually shifted 
from an expression of self-hate to a kind of emergency escape hatch, an emotional ejection seat 
if you will.  Having that option allowed me to go into the darkest and most frightening reaches of 
my buried memories.  While I would not recommend the possibility of suicide as an escape hatch 
for clients, I had to find a positive function for the suicidal urges that were part of my everyday 
thinking, and this strategy worked for me.   
 Creating and sustaining these shifts in the nature and purpose of different self-states were, 
again, not simple or smooth processes.  These issues had to be identified, acknowledged, 
negotiated, argued, and finally agreed upon.  Even after that work was done, self-states to whom 
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these new interpretations of their identities had been assigned had to learn how to live within 
these new meanings and interpretations.  They had to learn to shed inappropriate shame while 
working through appropriate and inevitable regret and remorse.  They had to learn to allow their 
own voices to enter the reconstructive self-discourse.  Self-states who had been harmed, 
frightened, or otherwise victimized by other self-states had to learn to forgive and eventually 
trust previously destructive others.  
 Ironically, one of the most difficult aspects of reframing the roles and functions of these 
self states was resistance on the part of several of the hospital staff, because part of the process of 
re-assigning roles was first to honor them. I had to recognize each of them as who they were and 
accept them fully before I could ask them to be something else.  I knew, somehow, that my 
shadow self-states had to be allowed to “come out” and be seen. The self-state in charge of this 
work, who was and is infinitely wise, wrote, “I need to be able to express my reality and have it 
believed, even if my reality is distorted. I can only challenge distortions if I don’t have to defend 
them.” 
  There is a self-state who we call “the shadow,” and he is the most terrifying of all. The 
shadow was always present in flashbacks of being raped by the doctor, so I thought that he was 
some manifestation of the doctor that I carried with me. Eventually, I came to realize that the 
shadow was part of me, one of my internal voices.  After having tried for a year to get rid of the 
shadow, in May 2000 I wrote, 
 So if the shadow is part of me, maybe I can’t banish it.  Maybe I need to learn to accept 
 it as part of the fabric of me, the part that feels so much guilt and self-hate, the part that 
 wants to cut and burn me, the same part that sometimes wants me dead.  If I can reframe 
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 my view of myself (admittedly no small task), maybe shadow will not go away, but at 
 least become a benign presence. 
 This process of reframing and assigning new roles to self-states is an ongoing process; 
like all of these healing actions it is fluid and dynamic.  But there have been more and more 
times when I felt that, overall, I was getting there.  At one point in this reframing process, I 
wrote, “For so long I’ve been trying to forgive myself when actually I should be thanking 
myself.” 
 The second type of re-storying that appeared throughout my journals, from very early in 
the recovery process, was the ability to imagine how my story might evolve in the future, that is, 
to imagine an ending of my own making.  This ability became, for me, a source of meaning-
making and a strong motivation to keep moving forward despite periods of overwhelming 
fatigue and frustration.  I realized that, if all I could hope for was to survive this ordeal, it would 
not have been worth the pain.  I knew that I needed to find a way to make something more out of 
my healing than simply to emerge from it with a pulse.   
 Eventually this desire evolved into the decision to become a counselor and the 
commitment to live “out loud” – that is, to make no secret of my abuse, to be proud of the work I 
have done to recover, and to use what I have learned in the service of others.  In my review of 
my journals, I was surprised to see how early my healing process these ideas began to emerge. In 
October of 1999, in the midst of doing some deep exploration of feminist spirituality, I wrote, 
 I know that all of this has to lead me into what I am to become, that healing is not just a 
 matter of getting back to where I started.  If there is not a truly new and different life for 
 me as a result of this, it will not have been worth the pain.  I will use what I am learning 
 in some arena beyond myself.  How or when is yet to be seen. 
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 Over time, I realized that my desire to become a therapist of some sort would only be 
possible after I had done a lot of healing work.  But the idea of using my experience to help 
others, and especially to provide a clear and credible voice for victims, served as a sort of beacon 
for me, a goal to work toward.  When I reached the point of being able to hear others’ stories in 
groups, and feel empathetic toward them but recognize that this other person’s pain was not my 
pain, I knew that I was getting close to being ready to pursue my new profession, and I began 
looking into graduate schools.   
 Another way I was able to influence my story was by deciding to bring a lawsuit against 
Dr. X.  This was not a decision to be made lightly, so it is probably good that I was a little crazy 
when I made it.  But again, the processes of discovery and giving depositions, which had the 
potential to compound the trauma (and did so, temporarily), ultimately helped me to strengthen 
my resolve and reclaim a sense of personal power and voice.  There were times when my resolve 
was severely tested, such as when the defense lawyers pawed through my journals and when I 
went through two days of deposition taken by three lawyers with Dr. X in the room.  When I 
walked out of that deposition, though, I knew that I had won.  Whether we went to court or not, 
whether the jury found in my favor or not, I had won.  I had stepped away from the shame and 
the fear and spoken my truth to a room full of men, including my perpetrator.  I had found and 
used my voice.  The suit, by the way, was settled out of court for a satisfactory amount of 
money.  
 Themes related to the embodied/transcendent self. 
 Body blame. 
 As I have previously discussed, the female body has been both revered and vilified for its 
ability to cause sexual arousal in men, and I would assert that the confusion this creates in 
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women is magnified exponentially in adolescent girls.  I remember the deep need that I felt to 
feel attractive – the popular girls were attractive.  They wore short skirts and opened an extra top 
button on their school uniform blouses.  But they weren’t considered sluts.  No one whispered 
about them behind their backs.  The message delivered to me repeatedly by my perpetrator was 
that I was beautiful and sexy, and that I was much more mature than anyone my age.  While the 
message that I was attractive was pleasing and reassuring to me, I also felt that my attractiveness 
“caused” his sexual advances.  In my journal I wrote: 
 I remember his eyes, his big bulging eyes, always staring me down, making me feel 
 naked even when I wasn’t, and I remember him shifting in his chair as [his erection 
 became visible] and making no attempt to hide it, and the stare would get more intense 
 and he would smile at me like some kind of animal about to attack… [He would] tell 
 me I was beautiful and I would think, then why do I feel so ugly and disgusting? 
 I had absorbed contradictory and shame-inducing beliefs about my body for my entire 
life.  I “knew” that being sexy was good, but being sexual was bad.  I had absorbed the 
contradictory cultural messages that female sexuality held some mysterious power over men, but 
we were to “act like ladies” and the religious (in my case, Catholic) view that sexuality for any 
reason other than procreation within marriage was sinful.  On a social, rather than religious, 
level, I learned that boys were stronger, smarter, faster, and could take what they wanted.  
Sexually, boys were studs; girls were sluts.  In one journal entry I simply wrote, “Being a girl 
isn’t safe.” 
 Another aspect of body blame that I found in my journals was the belief that I had 
“allowed” him to rape me by failing to use my physical ability to get up and walk away.  This 
failure to leave the abusive situation was partially due to dissociation, but it had more to do with 
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my fear of losing him.  Despite what he was doing to me, I believed that he was the only adult in 
my life who understood me.  Because of what he was doing to me, and his position in the world, 
I did not think any other adult would believe me or, if they did, they would blame me.  The 
intense need I felt for him compounded my sense of guilt.  From the first time I saw him, I liked 
the (nonsexual) attention he gave me, the fact that he listened to me non-judgmentally, and that 
he seemed to be the only adult who really understood me.  In my journal, I wrote, “He didn’t 
treat me like a freak.”  
 This belief, that he truly understood me and cared about me, was completely incongruent 
with the sexual abuse.  I couldn’t reconcile these two opposing realities, so I escaped them as 
well as I could.  In June 2000, I wrote about a memory of being in his office, really crying about 
something that was going on at the time (I don’t remember what) and that he proceeded to 
undress me as I was crying: 
 I was really crying hard now and I was very confused. But the whole time he kept telling  
 me he loved me. I didn’t try to stop him. He started taking my clothes off…and then he 
 stood there looking at me like he had just unwrapped a present…I was thinking, this 
 can’t be happening…It didn’t hurt. I didn’t feel anything. 
  I couldn’t risk losing him.  I felt like he was the only person in the world who 
 understood me and loved me.  I was willing to give him my body to keep that.  I didn’t 
 know it would cause so many problems.  I’m sorry.  I’m so, so sorry. 
 I often had a sense of leaving my body during the rapes, and I saw this, for a long time, as 
an act of willingly giving my body over to him, to use as he pleased.  I wrote that I felt “like an 
object being fucked,” not like a person at all.  The very worst of this failure to use my body for 
my own protection occurred when I was 17.  I was hospitalized at the time, but he had instructed 
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a staff member to bring me to his office, which was in the next block, for a session.  He raped me 
there, and I left my body and could not get it back.  I couldn’t move, speak, eat or drink, or do 
anything except breathe.  At that point he diagnosed me as catatonic.  That condition of extreme 
dissociation (which is how I now interpret it) lasted two weeks and very nearly killed me.  But 
the important thing is that not only did I live, but that was the last time he raped me.  In my 
deepest despair, my most profound loss of self, paradoxically came my source of survival.  It has 
taken years for me to truly see the power that came from this psychic death, but eventually I did.  
In one of my more recent journal entries I wrote, “The Phoenix is impressive, but it owes its very 
existence to the ashes.” 
 Another aspect of body blame that is a common source of confusion and shame for 
victims of CSA is the natural tendency of the body to become sexually aroused even when the 
sexual activity is not invited or desired.  In my writings, I expressed the belief that this physical 
response to sexual touch was proof that I must have wanted the sexual activity, and therefore I 
was at least partially to blame.  I expressed hatred for my body, believing that it was dirty and 
had betrayed me.  It took a tremendous amount of internal dialogue work, processing with my 
therapist, and confronting these deeply entrenched beliefs to even begin to chip away at this 
shame.  
 Not only did I remember feeling some aspects of the sexual abuse as physically pleasant, 
but I experienced body memories that occasionally contained elements of arousal as well.  Body 
memories are physical sensations that feel like the original abuse, but without the full sense of 
being back in the traumatic situation as would occur in a flashback.  In my experience, body 
memories were usually painful and very distressing, but at times they contained elements of 
sexual pleasure as well.  Those were the ones that caused me the most confusion and shame.  The 
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self-state that most fully remembers the abuse at the hands of the psychiatrist, and had the most 
intense and painful body memories wrote,  
 I keep trying to figure out if it felt like rape. I mean, some of it felt good and some of it 
 felt bad but I don’t think it felt violent.  But the body memories sometimes feel violent.  
 They feel like rape.   
 When I read this statement, I felt infuriated to know that I had tried to classify what he 
did as rape or not by whether it “felt like rape.”  I was 15 years old and emotionally vulnerable, 
and he was an adult and my doctor.  Of course it was rape. 
 Ownership and control of the body. 
 There are two elements within the theme of body ownership and control that emerged 
from the data. The first is fairly straightforward, in that the body is held captive during a rape, 
and when a child or adolescent is being raped on a regular basis, it is easy to come to believe that 
the body is not hers but her perpetrator’s.  This belief runs counter to the self-blaming belief, but 
the rules of logic don’t always apply in experiences such as this. The same self-state mentioned 
in the preceding paragraph expressed the feeling that Dr. X owned her body, not just in the past 
when the abuse was occurring, but in the present when body memories have dominated her 
experience.  She expressed the feeling of not really being in her body, but at the same time not 
being able to get him out of it.  
 I have experienced that sense of his lingering presence as well, as if he had infiltrated and 
contaminated me in some irreversible way.  Not long after I began to remember what he did, I 
would check the obituaries every day, hoping to find his name, believing that maybe if he was 
dead, the remnants of him that had seeped into my being might be released.  When he did finally 
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die, I did not find the release I had hoped for.  Getting rid of him was, and would continue to be, 
my work and my responsibility. 
  The second element of body ownership, however, is probably more difficult for someone 
who has not experienced it to understand.  This is the feeling among younger self-states of not 
having a body of their own, and having to “borrow” the adult self’s body when they want to be in 
control of the self-system.  In one journal entry, a teenage self-state wrote, “When I look in the 
mirror, I don’t really know who is looking back at me.  I just know that it’s not me.”  Another 
expressed the experience as having no body of her own, just borrowing “my” body and “putting 
it on and taking it off like socks.” 
 Themes related to the autonomous/relational self. 
 Power. 
 The power differential between myself as a teenager, already very troubled by past 
trauma and very emotionally needy, and the doctor charged with helping me is quite large and, in 
my opinion, self-evident.  Even so, I have had a tremendous amount of trouble relinquishing self-
blame.  My journal is filled with agonized litanies of all the things I thought I should have done:   
Why did I let him do this?  Why didn’t I just get up and leave?  Why didn’t I tell someone what 
was happening?  On an intellectual level, I can understand the power dynamics that prevented 
me from doing anything to stop the abuse.  But on a deeper level, where that self-state still 
struggles to occupy a strong “I” position, these questions continue to haunt me, and continue to 
be a focus of therapy work. 
 I stated earlier that I “decided” to go crazy as a way of escaping the rapes.  I would like to 
believe that I had enough power in that situation to make such a choice, but I honestly don’t 
know if I did.  By the time I was first diagnosed and hospitalized, my ability to function in the 
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world had deteriorated dramatically; I was highly dissociative, profoundly angry, and 
dangerously self-destructive.  I have also described my prolonged out-of-body state that was, at 
the time, diagnosed as catatonia.  None of these states or events was consciously chosen, and 
while they did have the effect of ultimately ending his sexual abuse of me, they were also the 
direct result of that abuse.  I cannot consider any of these events or states to be an exercise of 
power on my part.  To the contrary, the diagnosis of schizophrenia and the resultant 
hospitalization, along with the attendant major tranquilizers, ECT, and procedures such as 
restraint, served to take away whatever remaining personal power I might have had. 
 Returning to a psychiatric hospital 25 years later, even though it was a different hospital 
and a unit that dealt exclusively with trauma-based disorders, repeatedly brought back those 
feelings of powerlessness at the hands of the staff.  Most of the incidents that triggered those 
feelings would seem, at the surface, to be small, even trivial.  But it was the power difference, 
the fact that the staff held power over so many aspects of my activities, and the fact that power 
had been used in the past to do such tremendous harm, that magnified these incidents in my 
mind.   
 One example of a seemingly small but subjectively huge misuse of power is something 
that occurred during my first admission to the trauma-specialized hospital, and I recorded it in 
my journal but will paraphrase it here.  The tiny screw connecting the temple to the frame of my 
eyeglasses had fallen out.  This screw also held the lens inside the frame, so one of my lenses 
kept popping out.  I called my mother and asked her to buy a repair kit and bring it to the 
hospital.  The usual procedure for something like this was that the package would be left at the 
front desk, and the receptionist would call the unit staff to come retrieve it and give it to the 
patient.  I asked several members of the unit staff if my repair kit had been delivered, and for two 
72 
 
days they either said no or that they would find out.  Meanwhile, my lens kept popping out and 
falling to the floor as I went about going to groups and activities.  When someone finally 
bothered to look, it turned out that the kit had arrived the day I called my mother and asked for it.  
This miniscule event, or what would have been miniscule in the outside world, served to 
underscore my status as “patient” and was a reminder of all of the power struggles I had had in 
the past, and was a premonition of those I would have over the next several years. 
 I have a self-state who refuses to surrender her dignity to anyone.  Her ability to articulate 
righteous indignation in a way that did not diminish her credibility – by that I mean, her ability to 
get angry without appearing insane – was vital to my ability to reclaim my power when events 
such as the one described above happened.  This ability to speak up for herself, as we gradually 
shifted from a monologic to a dialogic self-system, has become increasingly available to my 
overall self as a means of reclaiming my power.  
 Diagnosis as identity. 
 The notion that a person with a mental health diagnosis becomes that diagnosis is one 
that many mental health professionals would vigorously deny.  We are urged to avoid such 
thinking, for example by using language that separates the person from the disorder.  For 
example, the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, 6
th
 ed. (APA, 
2010) states that we should use the term “a person with schizophrenia” rather than “a 
schizophrenic” (p. 72).  But we still, in casual as well as professional discourse, sometimes refer 
to clients as “bipolar” or “autistic” or “borderline.”  While changing the language is 
commendable, it falls far short of removing the diagnosis from our conceptualization of the 
person. This phenomenon of seeing the individual as a personification of some distinct 
psychopathology is still very present, particularly in inpatient settings (Johnstone, 2001). 
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 Resisting the connection of my diagnoses to my identity was especially important to me 
because I had already experienced it as a teenager when Dr. X diagnosed me as having 
schizophrenia.  That label had enormous power.  It took away my credibility as a person – 
something that would have served the doctor well if I were to tell anyone what he had done to 
me.  That label took away my dignity, as people began to see me as an insane person, to be 
pitied, feared, or made fun of.  It took away my range of emotional expression, as I discovered 
that everything I said, did, and felt was perceived through the lens of my diagnosis.  For 
example, what might be normal, appropriate anger in someone else was seen as “acting out” in 
me.  If, in response, I narrowed my expression, I could have been seen as displaying the “flat 
affect” that was considered to be characteristic of schizophrenia. I remember my former life in 
that world as like being in a game, for which I did not quite know the rules; I never knew when I 
might screw up, or what the consequences might be. My ability to process information and 
respond to it was slowed almost to a stop by the psychotropic drugs.  I felt, as I have expressed 
elsewhere in this paper, like an object. When contemplating the idea of what I might want to do 
or be when I was healthy, I wrote, “I don’t see the point in having any ambitions – objects don’t 
change or grow. They just sit there.”  The self-state that holds the memories of my years in 
hospitals, including frequent flashbacks of being raped by a shadowy, indistinct but very strong 
man, wrote this poem: 
 There is this place called Normal 
 I can’t find it 
 I search, and always 
 I miss the road signs 
 and end up in Crazy 
 such an awful place to be 
 
 crazy girl, you’ve got to talk  
 crazy girl, you’ve got to quiet down  
 crazy girl, you’d better move  
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 crazy girl, you’d better stop.  
  
 Don’t act out, crazy girl,  
 or on goes the leather  
 click go the locks 
 slam goes the door  
 and your tears  
 run into your ears  
 crazy girl 
  
 When my abuse memories resurfaced, I was given a new set of diagnostic labels.  The 
hardest, by far, to accept was the diagnosis of DID.  PTSD and depression, in my estimation, 
were not crazy, just “troubled.”  But DID was all-out crazy and the idea that I was returning to 
the life of a crazy person was repugnant and terrifying to me.  At the time I was diagnosed, I 
knew very little about DID beyond its portrayal in movies such as Sybil and The Three Faces of 
Eve.  I was afraid of being taken over by alien identities that existed in my own mind.  I was 
afraid of the realization that my physical self could (and did) engage in actions that were outside 
of my awareness.  I was afraid of what these selves might know, and of coming to know these 
things myself.  One of the poems I wrote attempted to express these fears: 
 Living in shadows  
 where light and sound  
 are muffled and muted  
 though voices abound  
 in the distance  
 and sometimes they cry  
 but I cover my ears  
 and I cover my eyes 
 
 Now the light, it stings  
 my eyes and it brings  
 into focus the pictures  
 from so long ago  
 and the things that I knew of  
 but never did know  
 in a way that is real,  
 of blood and of flesh  
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 and those who once stood 
 alone start to mesh  
 into someone brand new –  
 Is it me?  
 Is it you? 
 
 So walls come crumbling  
 boundaries melt  
 and all that I ever knew  
 or thought or felt  
 spreads like a disease  
 through all of me  
 the shadow is lifted  
 and so I must see. 
 
 While I was afraid of going through the feelings and experiences of DID itself, I was 
equally afraid of how returning to the role of “mental patient” would bring me back to the 
helplessness, despair, and indignity that I had known when I was thought to have schizophrenia.  
I knew that world; I had lived there before and had fought hard to escape it.  Returning to it, or 
more specifically my fear of returning to it, was immensely demoralizing.  Becoming a crazy 
person again was like falling into a hole – a sickeningly familiar hole.  McFarlane and Girolamo 
(1996, p. 139) acknowledge that “the experience of a psychological disorder can itself create the 
same sense of powerlessness and threat of disintegration that confront the victims of traumatic 
stress.”  In other words, the psychological distress created by remembering trauma is, in itself, 
traumatic.  This kind of multilayered distress, composed of the recovery of traumatic memories 
as well as the experience of becoming psychologically disordered, along with the memories of 
prior mental illness, is almost impossible to describe.  
 Redefining relationships and roles. 
 Because healing from CSA required that I deconstruct, then reconstruct, my self, many of 
my relationships with others were, inevitably I believe, changed.  Some of these changed for the 
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better, but many were eroded and some were lost altogether.  Likewise, my professional self-
image and roles changed drastically as I went through this transformative process.   
 At the time that I began to remember my abuse, I was fairly successful and well-regarded 
as a Clinical Nurse Specialist in critical care.  I had published in professional journals and 
written a textbook chapter, and I had coordinated as well as presented at numerous conferences 
at the local, regional, and national levels.  I was in the act of pursuing a contract to write a 
critical care nursing book.  About six months after I began to retrieve memories, I attended a 
regional conference of the critical-care nurses association. This had been my territory for years, 
and the previous two or three years I had coordinated this 3-day conference.  When I returned 
home, I wrote: 
 I just got back from Currents .The best way I can describe it is like visiting a foreign 
 country. That used to be my world.  I was up in front, making it happen, and now I feel 
 like I don’t even belong here. I feel so incomplete, and I don’t know who I even am any 
 more. 
  People were nice. They said they missed me and were glad to see me and I 
 knew they meant it. But I know how far I’ve travelled from the life I used to have and I 
 don’t know anything about the life ahead. I feel lost.  
 In retrospect, I can easily see that I had suppressed the reality of my trauma, and even my 
memory of it, in part by becoming so deeply involved in work.  I always felt compelled to do 
more, to do it better, but I never felt good enough.  Within my healing process, I have found the 
freedom to choose who and what I want to be, and let go of the need to be perfect. 
 Certainly the most painful relationship changes were those with my husband and 
children.  In the interest of protecting their privacy, I have chosen not to go into any great detail 
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regarding them, but I will say that they suffered right along with me, and in many cases because 
of me.  The disruption was especially painful for my children, as they essentially lost their 
mother for about two years.  In a very real sense we have had to heal as a family; while we all 
have wounds that have been slow to heal, but we also all have sensitivity and insight, wisdom 
and compassion that have been, at the very least, amplified by our experiences. 
The Overarching Theme of Voice 
 If I could scream 
 enough to satisfy  
 buildings would shake and crumble  
 the earth would shudder and split  
 rivers change course  
 if I could scream. 
 
 If I could scream  
 enough to express  
 the very sky would tremble  
 clouds would crack and weep  
 tidal waves would roar and crash ashore  
 if I could scream,  
 if I could scream. 
 
 This poem, which I wrote but did not mark with a date, was my best attempt at 
expressing the immensity of rage, terror, grief, and sorrow that built up in me as my memories 
began to return.  I would like to say that I have done all of the screaming I needed to do, that I 
have somehow reached the bottom of this pit and come back out, once and for all.  On some 
days, more now than ever, I might even believe that myself.  But the truth is that, there will never 
be enough tears, never enough screams or moans or sobs.  The experience of having one’s body 
invaded, one’s mind ambushed, and one’s self shredded is not something from which I ever 
expect to fully heal.  So what do I do with this?  How do I finally put it all in the past tense?  
How do I ever find a satisfactory answer for the agonized questions I have screamed to the night 
sky? 
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 I believe that the only answer, and the one unifying theme that I can draw from my 
experiences and my journals is that now I have a voice.  My story has awful things in it, 
shameful things, but I can tell my story and confidently declare that the shame is not mine.  My 
ability to make my own choices, to live the life that I planned and hoped for, was for so long 
taken from me, but I have firmly taken it back and I can declare it as my own.  My ability to 
love, to truly love without losing myself, without falling at the feet of some tyrant, has somehow 
been restored.  My body has been invaded, torn and vandalized, cut and burned, but it is here, 
and it can speak the truth.  My spirit has been tested to its limits, but I can dream and I can see 
myself as having something of value to share with the people I encounter.  As long as I can 
speak, and speak the truth, my life has value and meaning. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusions 
Summary of Findings 
 This study was intended to explore three broad questions: (1) How is the self expressed in 
therapeutic writing, such as journals, internal dialogue exercises, and poetry? (2) How does CSA 
inform the adult survivor’s sense of self? (3) How does the survivor’s sense of self shift or 
change in the process of recovery?  While the answers to these questions have been presented as 
they were found, woven through the tapestry of self-experience, story, and dialogue, I think it 
would be useful to reiterate the findings related to each of these specific questions. 
 In response to the question of how the self is expressed in therapeutic writings, I found 
that my self was expressed as the protagonist of narratives, as the actors in intricate internal 
dialogues, and as an entity with a fragile, but steadily increasing, ability to name and articulate 
powerful emotions, through poems and narratives.  My narratives, as they were told and re-told 
numerous times over several years, reflected a self who was able to develop a more complete and 
coherent self-story over time, and able to shift blame and shame from myself to my perpetrators.  
 Regarding the question of how CSA informs the adult survivor’s sense of self, the self 
that began this healing journey had been fractured, and so infused with shame, secrecy, and fear 
that I could no longer function. This pile of shards that I called my self were the ruins of what 
had been, itself, a false and poorly constructed façade. This fracturing, the inability to recall my 
own life story, the intense shame and sense of self-blame, and the terror of knowing that more 
memories would be coming, consumed me for almost two years, and was, for that period at least, 
the sum total of my existence. 
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 Regarding the question of how the self shifts and changes over time, as I continued to 
face and articulate my memories, learned to tolerate and, at times, to modulate my emotions, and 
form connections with others, I began to believe in the possibility of a future self, and that I 
could decide who this future self might be.  Having the ability to apply meaning to experiences 
that previously could only mean, to me, the willful wrath of a vengeful and merciless God or the 
randomness of a godless universe, gave me a perspective that included the hope of making 
something good. 
 In the earlier writings, my journal entries were more focused on the perpetrators and what 
they did to me; for several hundreds of pages I ruminated and ranted over the harm that had been 
inflicted on me and the things that had been stolen from me. I suppose that I need to do that, just 
to say and write over and over what had been held secret, even from my self, for so long. 
 Later in the journals, the focus gradually shifted to my self and my challenges, 
frustrations, periods of self-doubt, and victories. In dialogical terms (Hermans, 1996), this could 
be interpreted to represent a shift from a “me” position, which is one that is defined by others, to 
an “I” position, which is defined by my self.  This is the only self-position in which growth can 
happen.  This is the only position that has a voice. 
 Likewise, the internal dialogue work demonstrated a shift from an “I –me” to an “I – I”  
stance, as various self-states, including those that had held intensely negative emotions and self-
destructive urges, learned to allow themselves to be seen, to give voice to their memories, 
feelings, and beliefs, and to accept those same elements of discourse from other self-states. 
While this movement was excruciatingly slow, painful, contentious, and at times dangerous, it 
was central to my healing.  
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 Another change in my self, reflected primarily in narrative and poetic elements of the 
journal, was in the form and nature of my anger. Early in the processes of remembering and 
processing the memories, most of my anger was directed back at myself in the form of self-
harming and other dangerous behaviors.  As time went on, I learned to transform my angry 
energy into a powerful force for healing. I used it to sustain me through the process of bringing a 
lawsuit against my perpetrator. I learned to use it to effectively voice my perceptions and make 
my needs clearly known to professional and paraprofessional hospital staff. In short, my anger, 
which could have eaten me alive, gave me back my voice. 
 Another shift in my sense of self over time was movement away from a contrived, 
insecure façade of self-esteem, toward a more secure and authentic sense of dignity and value. 
What had been really a thin veneer of accomplishment that barely covered the always-afraid, 
often confused self inside, moved through a period of exterior as well as interior degradation, in 
order to claim a true voice, an authentic “I” position.  Whatever I accomplish now belongs to me, 
even if I am still unaccustomed to feeling secure in my successes. 
Implications for Future Research 
 As I reported in this paper, I selected only samples of my own writings as data for my 
research. There is much more that I, or I with another researcher, could explore and analyze. I 
would also like to analyze the journals of other CSA survivors – not as an attempt at replication, 
but to discover and learn about other people’s paths to healing. 
 There are more specific and delimited research questions embedded in this work as well, 
and not all of them are directed at the healing processes of survivors per se.  In my experience, 
and in the professional literature (e.g., Herman, 1992; Krawitz, 2004), there is recognition that 
the complex and frustrating clinical presentation of CSA survivors triggers negative, even hostile 
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reactions on the part of mental health professionals. I would like to see research conducted on the 
beliefs and attitudes of mental health professionals toward adult survivors of CSA, and how 
these may impact their provision of care. Perhaps a survey or structured interview of a group of 
providers, conducted at the same time as a content analysis of client record written by the same 
individuals would yield significant results. Even more telling, I think, would be to enter the 
inpatient care environment as a participant-observer, although the ethical and practical hurdles 
would be substantial.  
 There are numerous other research questions suggested by this study. The ones that come 
most readily to mind are: 
 1. What specific problems are likely to occur in survivors of adolescent, as compared to 
earlier childhood, abuse? 
 2. How can therapeutic writing best be used in the process of healing from CSA? 
 3. What are the characteristics of an emotionally safe and effective counselor-client 
relationship from the client’s perspective? From the counselor’s? 
 4. What factor(s) might indicate a readiness to bring “shadow selves” into the therapeutic 
work? 
 5. What is the nature of shame in survivors of CSA, viewed from a narrative/dialogic 
perspective? 
 6. What elements of traditional mental health care may be experienced by the client as re-
traumatizing? How can these effects safely and realistically be minimized? 
Implications for Counselor Education, Supervision, and Practice 
 Considering the prevalence of childhood trauma, including CSA, in virtually all 
populations of mental health and substance abuse clients, I would advocate for some course 
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content on the mechanisms of traumatic stress responses in all programs that prepare mental 
health care providers.  I would like to see counselor educators seek and use first-person accounts 
of emotional distress whenever possible, and to generate class discussions that place the student 
in the “shoes” of the other in order that they may develop a more accurate and genuine empathy 
for the clients, not only in their dysfunction but in their tenacity and the strength of their survival.  
 If I could choose one effect that my study might have on the practice and teaching of 
counseling, it would be that counselors strive to connect with the dialectic of humility and 
knowing.  This is not a dimension that I expected to explore in my research, but it is one that 
became more and more apparent to me as I went through this process. The depiction of my self 
and my healing process, as presented in this study, will provide insight to counselors if I have 
done my job well. But insight without action is useless.  This realization led me to the big 
question that springs up from many a dissertation: So what? What do I do with this once I have 
read it? Where does its usefulness lie? 
 These questions led me back to my research processes of identifying relevant dimensions 
for study, and the dimensions of humility and knowing as dialectical positions in the counseling 
process and in its teaching became a compelling focus for me.  It is, I think, within this 
dimension that counselor and client (as well as educator/supervisor and student/supervisee) can 
meet and develop an “I-Thou” relationship.  In such a relationship, the counselor can see and 
honor the inner wisdom and inherent dignity in any client, regardless of how dysfunctional the 
client’s behavior might be. It is in this kind of relationship that the counselor can find and 
acknowledge the client’s strengths and assets, and bring these into the honest, meaningful 
dialogue that comes from such a relationship.  This is the position of meeting, from which the 
counselor can acknowledge, without the fear of crossing an arbitrary line of professional 
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distance, those essential elements of humanity that the client and the counselor share, and where 
humility lives (Birrell, 2006; Freedberg, 2007; Spinelli, 2001).  The likely result, then, would be 
that in such a space, the client could begin the long but potentially transformative process of 
rediscovering her or his own humanity, and recognize and honor the innate knowledge and 
wisdom that allowed her or him to survive in the first place, and use those assets to begin 
healing.  
   
85 
 
References 
Abdulrehman, R. Y., & DeLuca, R. V. (2001). The implications of childhood sexual abuse on 
 adult social behavior. Journal of Family Violence, 16, 193 - 203. 
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
 (4
th
 ed., text revision). Washington, DC: Author. 
American Psychological Association. (n.d.) What is child sexual abuse? Retrieved online 
 9/23/2009 from http://www.apa.org/releases/sexabuse/  
American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological 
 Association (6
th
 ed.). Washington, DC: Author.  
Banyard, V., Williams, L. M., & Siegel, J. A. (2001). The long-term mental health consequences 
 of child sexual abuse: An exploratory study of the impact of multiple traumas in a sample 
 of women. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 14, 697 - 715. 
Barowski, B. M. (2007). Reflecting on adversarial growth and trauma through autoethnography. 
 Journal of Loss and Trauma, 12, 101 - 110. doi: 10.1080/15325020600864528 
Battersby, C. (1998). The phenomenal woman: Feminist metaphysics and the patterns of identity. 
  New York: Routledge. 
Belenky, M. F., Clinchy, B. M., Goldberger, N. R., & Tarule, J. M. (1986, 1997). Women’s ways 
 of knowing. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Bernsten, D. & Rubin, D. C. (2007). When a trauma becomes a key to identity: Enhanced 
 integration of trauma memories predicts posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. Applied 
 Cognitive Psychology,21, 417 - 431. doi: 10.1002/acp.1290  
Birrell, P. J. (2006). An ethic of possibility: Relationship, risk, and presence. Ethics & Behavior, 
 16, 95 - 115. 
Blaauw, E., Arensman, E., Kraaij, V., Winkel, F. W., & Bout, R. (2002). Traumatic life events 
 and suicide risk among jail inmates: The influence of types of events, time period and 
 significant others. Journal of Traumatic Stress 15, 9 - 16. 
Bohan, J. S. (2002). Sex differences and/in the self: Classic themes, feminist variations, 
 postmodern challenges. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 26, 74 - 88. 
Bowen, G. A. (2006). Grounded theory and sensitizing concepts. International Journal of 
 Qualitative Methods, 5(3), Article 2. Retrieved [08-26-2007] from http://www. 
 ualberta.ca/~ijqm/backissues/5_3/pdf/bowen.pdf 
Brabeck, M. M. (Ed.) (2000). Practicing feminist ethics in psychotherapy. Washington, DC: 
  American Psychological Association. 
Brison, S. J. (2002). Aftermath: Violence and the remaking of a self. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
  University Press. 
Brown, L. S. (2004). Feminist paradigms of trauma treatment. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, 
  Practice, Training, 41, 464 - 471. 
Burnard, P. (2007). Seeing the psychiatrist: An autoethnographic account. Journal of Psychiatric 
 and Mental Health Nursing, 14, 808 - 813. 
Cahill, A. J. (2001). Rethinking rape. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Clandinin, D. J., & Connelly, F. M. (2000). Narrative Inquiry: Experience and story in 
 qualitative research. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Cooper, M. (2003). “I – I” and “I – Me”: Transposing Buber's interpersonal attitudes to the 
 intrapersonal plane. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 16, 131 - 153. doi: 
 10.1080/10720530390117911 
86 
 
Courtois, C. A. (1996). Healing the incest wound: Adult survivors in therapy. New York: W. W. 
  Norton & Co.  
Courtois, C. A. (2004). Complex trauma, complex reactions: Assessment and treatment. 
  Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 41, 412 - 425. 
Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among five 
  approaches. (2
nd
 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Daigneault, I., Tourigny, M., & Hebert, M. (2006). Self-attributions of blame in sexually abused 
 adolescents: A mediational model. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 19,153 - 157. doi: 
 10.1002/jts.20101  
D’Andrea, M. D. (2000). Postmodernism, constructivism, and multiculturalism: Three forces 
 reshaping and expanding our thoughts about counseling. Journal of Mental Health 
 Counseling, 22, 1 - 16. 
De Civita, M., Bernatsky, S., & Dobkin, P. L. (2004). The role of depression in mediating the 
 association between sexual abuse history and pain in women with fibromyalgia. 
 Psychology, Health & Medicine, 9, 450-455. doi: 10.1080/13548500412331298975 
Diehl, A. S. & Prout, M. F. (2002). Effects of posttraumatic stress disorder and child sexual 
 abuse on self-efficacy development. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 72, 262 - 265. 
 doi: 10.1037//0002-9432.72.2.262  
DiMaggio, G. (2006). Disorganized narratives in clinical practice. Journal of Constructivist 
 Psychology, 19, 103 - 108. doi: 10.1080/10720530500508696 
Draper, B., Pfaff, J. J., Pirkis, J., Snowdon, J., Lautenschlager, N. T., Wilson, I., & Almeida, O. 
 P. (2008). Long-term effects of childhood abuse on the quality of life and health of older 
 people: Results from the depression and early prevention of suicide in general practice 
 project. Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 56, 262 - 271. doi: 10.1111/j.1532-
 5415.2007.01537.x 
Duncan, M. (2004). Autoethnography: Critical appreciation of an emerging art. International 
 Journal of Qualitative Methods, 3(4), Article 3. Retrieved 5-21-2009 from 
 http://www.ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/3_4/pdf/duncan.pdf  
Ellis, C. (1999). Heartful autoethnography. Qualitative Health Research, 9, 669 - 683. 
Feiring, C., Simon, V. A., & Cleland, C. M. (2009). Childhood sexual abuse, stigmatization, 
 internalizing symptoms, and the development of sexual difficulties and dating aggression. 
 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 77, 127 - 137. doi: 10.1037/a0013475 
Fivush, R., & Baker-Ward, L. (2005). The search for meaning: Developmental perspectives on 
 internal state language in autobiographical memory. Journal of Cognition and 
 Development, 6, 455 - 462.  
Foster, K., McAllister, M., & O’Brien, L. (2006). Extending the boundaries: Autoethnography as 
 an emergent method in mental health nursing research. International Journal of Mental 
 Health Nursing, 15, 44 - 53. doi: 10.1111/j.1447-0349.2006.00402.x 
Freedberg, S. (2007). Re-examining empathy: A relational-feminist point of view. Social Work, 
 52, 251 - 259. 
Friedman, M. (1997). Autonomy and social relationships. In D. T. Myers (Ed.). Feminists 
  rethink the self (pp. 40 – 61). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Friedman, M. (2008). Buber and dialogical therapy: Healing through meeting. The Humanistic 
 Psychologist, 36, 298 - 316. doi: 10.1080/08873260802350014 
Gilligan, C. (1993). In a different voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
87 
 
Gold, S. N. (2004). The relevance of trauma to general clinical practice. Psychology: Theory, 
 Research, Practice, Training, 41, 363 - 373.  
Gremillion, H. (2004). Unpacking essentialisms in therapy: Lessons for feminist approaches 
 from narrative work. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 17, 173 - 200.  
 doi:10.1080/10720530490447112 
Hackmann, D. G. (2002). Using portraiture in educational leadership research. International 
  Journal of Leadership in Education, 5, 51-60. doi: 10.1080 /1360312011005710 9 
Harden, J. (2000). Language, discourse and the chronotope: Applying literary theory to the 
 narratives in health care. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 31, 506 - 512. 
Harter, S. L. (2007). Visual art making for therapist growth and self-care. Journal of 
 Constructivist Psychology, 20, 167 - 182. doi: 10.1080/10720530601074721 
Herman, J. (1992). Trauma and recovery: The aftermath of violence – from domestic abuse to 
  political terror.  New York: Basic Books. 
Hermans, H. H. (1996). Voicing the self: From information processing to dialogical interchange. 
 Psychological Bulletin, 119, 31 - 50. 
Hermans, H. H. (2003). The construction and reconstruction of a dialogical self. Journal of 
 Constructivist Psychology. 16, 89-130. doi: 10.1080/10720530390117902 
Hesse-Biber, S. N., & Leavy, P. L. (2007). Feminist research practice: A primer. Thousand 
 Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Hoffman, R. M. (2006). Gender self-definition and gender self-acceptance in women: 
 Intersections with feminist, womanist, and ethnic identities. Journal of Counseling and 
 Development, 84, 358 - 372. 
Hollander, P. (2004). Cherchez la femme, cherchez la femme: A paradoxical response to trauma. 
 Psychiatry, 67, 212 - 216. 
Hoskins, M. L. (2000). Living research: The experience of researching self, other, and discourse. 
 Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 13, 47 - 66.  
Hoult, J. (1998). Silencing the victim: The politics of discrediting child abuse survivors. Ethics 
 and Behavior, 8,125 - 140. 
Ingersoll, R. E., & Cook-Greuter, S. R. (2007). The self-system in integral counseling. 
 Counseling and Values, 51, 193 - 208. 
Johnston, D., & Strong, T. (2008). Reconciling voices in an autoethnographic thesis. 
 International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 7, 47 - 61.  
Johnstone, M. (2001). Stigma, social justice and the rights of the mentally ill: Challenging the 
 status quo. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Mental Health Nursing, 10, 200 - 
 209. 
Kahn, A. S., Jackson, J., Kully, C., Badger, K., & Halvorsen, J. (2003). Calling it rape: 
 Differences in experiences of women who do and do not label their sexual assault as rape. 
 Psychology of Women Quarterly, 27, 233 - 242. 
Kessler, B. L., & Bieschke, K. J. (1999). A retrospective analysis of shame, dissociation, and 
 adult victimization in survivors of childhood sexual abuse. Journal of Counseling 
 Psychology, 46, 335 - 341. 
Krawitz, R. (2004). Borderline personality disorder: Attitudinal change following training. 
  Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 38, 554 - 559. 
Kristensen, E., & Lau, M. (2007). Women with a history of childhood sexual abuse: Long-term 
 social and psychiatric aspects. Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 61, 115 - 120.  
 doi: 10.1080/08039480701226096 
88 
 
Lambie, G. W. (2005). Child abuse and neglect: A practical guide for professional school  
 counselors. Professional School Counseling, 8, 249 - 258.  
Lang, A. J., Aarons, G. A., Gearity, J., Laffaye, C., Satz, L., Dresselhaus, T. R., & Stein, M. B. 
 (2008). Direct and indirect links between childhood maltreatment, posttraumatic stress 
 disorder, and women’s health. Behavioral Medicine, 33, 125 - 135. 
Lawrence-Lightfoot, S., & Davis, J. H. (1997). The art and science of portraiture. San 
  Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass/Wiley. 
Linehan, M. M. (1993). Cognitive-behavioral treatment of borderline personality disorder. New 
  York: The Guilford Press. 
Livingston, J. A., Hequembourg, A., Testa, M., & VanZile-Tamsen, C. (2007). Unique aspects of 
 adolescent sexual victimization experiences. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 31, 331 -
 343. 
Malterud, K. (2001). Qualitative research: Standards, challenges, and guidelines. The Lancet, 
  358, 483 - 488. 
Mathison, S. (1988). Why triangulate? Educational Researcher, 17(2), 13 - 17.  
McAdams, D. P. (2001). The psychology of life stories. Review of General Psychology, 5(2): 
  100 – 122. 
McAdams, D. P. (2006). The problem of narrative coherence. Journal of Constructivist 
 Psychology, 19, 109 - 125. doi: 10.1080/10720530500508720 
McFarlane, A. C., & De Girolamo, G. (1996). The nature of traumatic stressors and the  
 epidemiology of posttraumatic reactions.  In B. A. Van der Kolk, A. C. McFarlane, & L. 
 Weisaeth (Eds.). Traumatic stress: The effects of overwhelming experience on mind, 
 body, and society. ( pp. 129 – 154). New York: The Guilford Press. 
McIntyre, M., & Cole, A. L. (2001). Conversations in relation: The research relationship in/as 
 artful self-study. Reflective Practice, 2, 5 - 25. doi: 10.1080/14623940120035497  
Meares, R. (1999). Value, trauma, and personal reality. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 63, 
 443 - 458. 
Milligan, R. & Andrews, B. (2005). Suicidal and other self-harming behaviour in offender 
 women: The role of shame, anger, and childhood abuse. Legal and Criminological 
 Psychology, 10, 13 - 25. doi: 10.1348/135532504X15439  
Muncey, T. (2005). Doing autoethnography. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 4(3), 
 Article 5. Retrieved 5/21/2009 from 
 http://www.ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/4_1/pdf/muncey.pdf 
Muncey, T., & Robinson, R. (2007). Extinguishing the voices: Living with the ghost of the  
 disenfranchised. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 14, 79 - 84. 
Murray, C., & Waller, G. (2002). Reported sexual abuse and bulimic psychopathology among 
 nonclinical women: The mediating role of shame. International Journal of Eating 
 Disorders, 32, 186 - 191. doi: 10.1002/eat.10062 
Neimeyer, R. A., Herrero, O., & Botella, L. (2006). Chaos to coherence: Psychotherapeutic 
 integration of traumatic loss. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 19, 127 - 145. doi: 
 10.1080/10720530500508738 
Norum, K. E. (2000). Black (w)holes: A researcher’s place in her research. Qualitative 
 Sociology, 23, 319 - 340. 
Offman, A., & Kleinplatz, P. J. (2004). Does PMDD belong in the DSM? Challenging the 
 medicalization of women’s bodies. The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality, 13, 17-
 27. 
89 
 
O’Kearney, R. & Perrott, K. (2006). Trauma narratives in posttraumatic stress disorder: A 
 review. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 19, 81 - 93. doi: 10.1002/jts.20099  
Pica, M. (1999). The evolution of alter personality states in dissociative identity disorder. 
 Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 36, 404 - 415.  
 doi: 10.1037/0033-3204.36.4.404 
Quimby, E. (2006). Ethnography’s role in assisting mental health research and clinical practice. 
 Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62, 859 - 879. doi: 10.1002/jclp.20277  
Raskin, J. D. (2008). The evolution of constructivism. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 21, 
 1 - 24. doi: 10.1080/10720530701734331  
Read, J., Agar, K., Barker-Collo, S., Davies, E., & Moskowitz, A. (2001). Assessing suicidality 
 in adults: Integrating childhood trauma as a major risk factor. Professional Psychology: 
 Research and Practice, 32, 367 - 372. doi: 10.1037//0735-7028.32.4.367 
Roy, A, & Janal, M. (2005). Family history of suicide, female sex, and childhood trauma: 
 separate or interacting risk factors for attempts at suicide? Acta Psychiatrica 
 Scandinavica, 112, 367 - 371. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-0447.2005.00647.x 
Scheman, N. (1997). Queering the center by centering the queer: Reflections on transsexuals and 
 secular Jews. In D. T. Myers (Ed.). Feminists Rethink the Self (pp. 124 - 162) Boulder, 
 CO: Westview Press. 
Segal, D. L. (2009). Self-reported history of sexual coercion and rape negatively impacts 
 resilience to suicide among women students. Death Studies, 33, 848 - 855. doi: 
 10.1080/07481180903142720 
Sewell, K. W., & Williams, A. M. (2002). Broken narratives: Trauma, metaconstructive gaps, 
 and the audience of psychotherapy. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 15, 205 - 218. 
 doi: 10.1080/1072053029010044 2 
Shaunesey, K., Cohen, J. L., Plummer, B., & Berman, A. (1993). Suicidality in hospitalized 
 adolescents: Relationship to prior abuse. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry,63,  
 113 - 119. 
Spinelli, E. (2001). Listening to our clients: A dangerous proposal. American Journaal of 
 Psychotherapy, 55, 357 - 363. 
St. Maurice, H. (2002). Self-study of supervisory practices in beginning teacher terminations. 
  International Journal of Leadership in Education, 5, 61 - 75. 
Straker, G., Watson, D., & Robinson, T. (2002). Trauma and disconnection: A trans-theoretical 
 approach. International Journal of Psychotherapy, 7, 145 - 158. doi: 
 10.1080/1356908021000016828 
Sutherland, K., & Bryant, R. A. (2005). Self-defining memories in post-traumatic stress disorder. 
 British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44, 591 - 598. doi:10.1348/014466505X64081 
Testa, M., VanZile-Tamsen, C., & Livingston, J. A. (2005). Childhood sexual abuse, relationship 
 satisfaction, and sexual risk taking in a community sample of women. Journal of 
 Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 73, 1116 - 1124. doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.73.6.1116 
Thiele, C., Laireiter, A-R., & Baumann, U. (2002). Diaries in clinical psychology and 
 psychotherapy: A selective review. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 9, 1 - 37. 
 doi: 10.1002/cpp.302 
Thompson, B. L. & Waltz, J. (2008). Self-compassion and PTSD symptom severity. Journal of 
 Traumatic Stress, 21, 556 - 558. doi: 10.1002/jts.20374 
90 
 
Van der Hart, O., Nijenhuis, E., Steele, K., & Brown, D. (2004). Trauma-based dissociation: 
 Conceptual clarity lost and found. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 
 38, 906 - 914. 
Van der Kolk, B. A. (1996). The body keeps the score: Approaches to the psychobiology of 
 posttraumatic stress disorder. In B. A. Van der Kolk, A. C. McFarlane, & L. Weisaeth  
 (Eds.).  Traumatic stress: The effects of overwhelming experience on mind, body, and 
 society. (pp. 214 – 241). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Van der Kolk, B. A., McFarlane, A. C., & Weisaeth, L. (Eds.) (1996). Traumatic stress: The 
 effects of overwhelming experience on mind, body, and society. New York: The Guilford 
 Press. 
Van der Kolk, B. A., Roth, S., Pelcovitz, D., Sunday, S., & Spinazzola, J. (2005).  Disorders of  
 extreme stress: The empirical foundation of a complex adaptation to trauma.  Journal of 
 Traumatic Stress, 18, 389-399. doi: 10.1002/jts.20047 
Verona, E., Hicks, B. M., & Patrick, C. J. (2005). Psychopathy and suicidality in female 
 offenders: Mediating influences of personality and abuse. Journal of Consulting and 
 Clinical Psychology, 73, 1065 - 1073. doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.73.6.1065 
Weierich, M. R., & Nock, M. K. (2008). Posttraumatic stress symptoms mediate the relations 
 between childhood sexual abuse and nonsuicidal self-injury. Journal of Consulting and 
 Clinical Psychology, 76, 39 - 44. doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.76.1.39 
White, J. W., Russo, N. F., & Travis, C. B. (2001). Feminism and the decade of behavior.  
 Psychology of Women Quarterly, 25, 267 - 279.  
Williams, W. I. (2006). Complex trauma: Approaches to theory and treatment.  Journal of Loss 
 and Trauma, 11, 321 - 335. doi: 10.1080/153250206000663078  
Worell, J., & Etaugh, C. (1994). Transforming theory and research with women. Psychology of 
  Women Quarterly, 18, 443 - 450. 
 
 
  
91 
 
Appendix A: Thematic Structure 
Construction of Self in an Adult Survivor of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Thematic Structure 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Central Construct: Self 
 
 
Relevant Dimension: 
Narrative Self (NS) 
Relevant Dimension:  
Autonomous Self (AS) 
Relevant Dimension:  
Embodied Self (ES) 
Thematic elements: 
 
Story/plot (NS-s) 
Vision of future (NS-fut) 
Narrative gaps (NS-ng) 
Dissociative experiences (NS-dis) 
Myths (NS-my) 
Self- references (NS-me) 
Epiphanies (NS-e) 
Cause-and-effect (NS-ce) 
Nonverbal elements (NS-nv) 
Thematic elements: 
 
Locus of control (AS-loc) 
Locus of blame (AS-lob) 
Interpersonal power  
   differences (AS-ipp) 
Institutional power (AS-inp) 
Relationships (AS-r) 
Cognitive abilities (AS-cog) 
Freedom of movement (AS-mov) 
Thematic elements: 
 
Sexuality & violence (ES-sv) 
Kinesthetic memory (ES-km) 
Self-harm (ES-sh) 
Body image (ES-bi) 
Gendered properties  
   of sexual abuse (ES-gen) 
Body awareness (ES-aw) 
Body control/ownership (ES-own) 
Contextual Elements: 
 
Times/dates 
Place/situation 
Life events 
Opportunities for “thick” description 
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Appendix B: Coding Sheet 
Date/Page Narrative Self Autonomous 
Self 
Embodied 
Self 
Contextual 
elements/events/comments 
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